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The last two (out of six) changes of the Constitution of 
the Kyrgyz Republic have struck everyone with their un-
expectedness and speed of adoption. Perhaps a state-
ment that the main changes in the Constitution took 
place mainly because of redistribution of power be-
tween two popularly elected government bodies- the 
president and parliament- will not come as a surprise. 
These two main government bodies receive the most 
power from the people - all other government bodies 
consist of one or both of them. Precisely because of their 
popular election, however, there is a concentration of 
fundamental contradictions and confl icts with the soci-
ety, its ethnic, denominational, linguistic, and regional 
divisions. Two popularly elected bodies fi nd diffi  culties 
in reaching compromises, while powers and relations 
between them are changed in the Constitution. Howev-
er, both in the Constitution and in practice, responsibil-
ity of these popularly elected bodies to the population 
for the results of their activities remains unchanged. 
In this article there is an analysis of the Constitu-
tion of November 2006 and what has changed 
in the Constitution as signed by the president in 
January 2007, and how this in the end infl uenc-
es the balance of power between the president 
and parliament and the situation in the country.
The status and prerogatives of the president remained 
intact both in the 2006 and 2007 Constitutions. The 
president is the head of state, the highest offi  cial of the 
Kyrgyz Republic, a symbol of the unity of the people and 
government, guarantor of the Constitution, rights and 
freedoms of the citizen. He determines the main direc-
tions of internal and foreign policy of the state, repre-
sents the state, takes measures to guard the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of the Kyrgyz Republic, and en-
sures the unity, coordinated functioning and interaction 
of state bodies and their responsibility to the people.
About the responsibility of the state before the 
people: The meaning of any state system is in its re-
sponsibility to the population, which forms and 
maintains it. For the people, the responsibility of the 
state consists of accountability for the work of the 
Cabinet - so that the people know who to thank, and 
who to hold accountable, for the work of the Cabi-
net (the executive body responsible for revenues and 
expenditures of state budget, providing citizens’ se-
curity, implementing pricing, tariff , and tax policy).
The signifi cance of the Cabinet is so great that the issue 
of its longevity and effi  ciency is critical for any system 
of state structure. In a parliamentary system, parlia-
ment dismisses the Cabinet and therefore parliament is 
collectively responsible for the work of the Cabinet.  In 
a presidential system, the president dismisses the Cabi-
net and is personally responsible for their work.  In a 
premier-presidential system (like in France and Poland) 
Cabinet depends on the confi dence of parliament; if 
parliament supports the president then the president 
heads the Cabinet. If parliament does not support the 
president then the prime minister heads the Cabinet. 
In our system  (presidential-parliamentary) it is diffi  cult 
for the layperson and specialist alike to know whom to 
hold accountable for the work of the Cabinet. If there 
are petrodollars, like in the similar systems of neighbor-
ing Kazakhstan and Russia, then accountability has less 
importance; there are resources, big markets conducive 
for business, and the majority of people are satisfi ed. 
In Kyrgyzstan, a lack of economic resources and pos-
sibilities requires eff ective organization of government, 
which is maintained by honest people for their last 
crumbs. In Kyrgyzstan both president and parliament 
have powers to dismiss the Cabinet. The president pre-
sides over this system but neither the president nor par-
liament bear responsibility for the work of the Cabinet. 
The rule of the 2003 Constitution remained intact in 
2006 and 2007 Constitutions. According to this rule,
• As a result of hearing annual report of the prime 
minister at the initiative of 1/3 of MPs (simple major-
ity in 2003 Constitution), parliament may, by a simple 
majority (2/3 in 2003 Constitution) cast a vote of no 
confi dence in the Cabinet.
• After the vote of no confi dence the president has a 
right to make a decision on dissolution of the Cabinet 
or to contest parliament’s decision.
• Should parliament choose again within three months 
to pass a vote of no confi dence in the Cabinet then 
the president announces dissolution of the Cabinet or 
appoints early elections of parliament (dissolves par-
liament).
According to 1993 Constitution, the Cabinet was de-
pendent on the confi dence of parliament. The presi-
dent could dismiss only individual Cabinet members. 
However, in order to dissolve the entire Cabinet the 
president needed parliament’s consent. Parliament 
by a simple majority could pass a vote of no con-
fi dence in the entire Cabinet or individual Cabinet 
member, and thus the Cabinet was dependent on 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND POWERS OF THE HIGHEST 
GOVERNMENT BODIES IN KYRGYZSTAN: A NEW BALANCE?
Gulnara Iskakova, LLM, Associate Professor of law, American University-Central Asia 
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Forming of the Cabinet
the confi dence of parliament. So back then a pre-
mier-presidential system existed in Kyrgyzstan. 
According to Constitutions of 2003, 2006 and 
2007, the president dissolves the Cabinet if:
• 1) he accepts resignation request of the prime minis-
ter or the Cabinet;
• 2) parliament passes a vote of no confi dence in the 
Cabinet and the president agrees with it;
• 3) parliament within three months again passes a 
vote of no confi dence in the Cabinet. In this case the 
president at his own discretion dissolves either the 
Cabinet or parliament.
Compared to the 2006 and 2007 Constitutions, in the 
2003 Constitution, the Cabinet depended more on the 
president. The president could personally dismiss the 
prime minister or the entire Cabinet. Whereas accord-
ing to Constitutions of 2006 and 2007, the president 
of his own initiative (or at the suggestion of the prime 
minister) can dismiss a Cabinet member but cannot dis-
miss the entire Cabinet of his own initiative. Parliament 
may also dismiss a Cabinet member by passing a vote 
of no confi dence in him/her again within six months. 
Thus, according to the 2007 Constitution the presi-
dent in the end decides whether to dismiss the Cabi-
net or not. That is, the presidential-parliamentary sys-
tem established by 2003 Constitution is preserved.
In contrast to the 2003 Constitution, the right of the pres-
ident to preside over Cabinet meetings and invalidate 
acts of the Cabinet was excluded in 2006 Constitution. 
At the same time, the Constitution of 2007 introduced 
new provisions according to which the president may 
set goals and tasks before the Cabinet. That is, at his 
own discretion the president may interfere in the work 
of the Cabinet, although the prime minister (who is de-
pendent on the president) is responsible for the work of 
the Cabinet. The president retained the right to suspend 
any acts of the Cabinet as it was in the 2003 Constitution. 
The powers of the prime minister were listed in de-
tail in the 1993 Constitution, indicative of the prime 
minister’s signifi cance and his personal responsibility 
for the work of the entire Cabinet. In the 2003, 2006 
and 2007 Constitutions powers of the prime minister 
are not mentioned separately; the prime minister re-
mains a relatively weak fi gure who at the same time 
is dependent both on the president and parliament.
The constitutions of 1993 and 2007 establish diff erent 
orders for the forming of the Cabinet. Certain shortcom-
ings of the 2006 Constitution were adjusted in the 2007 
Constitution. So, for instance, according to the 2006 Con-
stitution a political party became has the right to form a 
Cabinet. This means that a voluntary public association 
that vies for power and not necessarily elected by the 
majority of the population may participate in forming 
the top government body - the Cabinet. The president 
had a right to choose this party at his/her own discretion.
Now according to the 2007 Constitution, MPs elected 
from party lists have the right to form a Cabinet, which 
is better since voters elect MPs. But there is no constitu-
tion in the world where political parties or MPs elected 
from party lists are formal and legal holders of the right 
to form a Cabinet - this is a purely Kyrgyz invention. 
Besides, the president is placed above parliament in 
the hierarchy of power due to a provision whereby the 
president “commissions” MPs from a political party to 
nominate a prime minister (in 2006 wording the presi-
dent had a right to commission free public associa-
tions of the civil society - parties). Although in principle 
parliament is independent of the president since the 
people legitimize it. Therefore, relations between the 
president and parliament are not relations of author-
ity and subordination, but relations of bodies that are 
independent of each other, having separate competen-
cies and powers in checking and infl uencing each other. 
According to the 2003 Constitution, the president:
• had a right to determine the structure of the Cabinet;
• with parliament’s consent appointed the prime min-
ister;
•  at the prime minister’s suggestion and with parlia-
ment’s consent, appointed Cabinet members.
Whereas parliament:
• approved the structure of the Cabinet proposed by 
the president;
• gave consent to appointment of the prime minister 
and Cabinet members.
The prime minister advised the president on candida-
cies for offi  ces of Cabinet members.
According to the 2006 Constitution, the president:
• Approved (now according to the 2007 Constitution 
the president appoints) the prime minister (nominat-
ed by a political party);
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• Approved Cabinet members (now according to the 
2007 Constitution, the president appoints them);
• gave consent to the prime minister to submit Cabinet 
structure to parliament.
Candidates for the offi  ce of the prime minister are pro-
posed to the president:
• By a party receiving more than 50% of seats in parlia-
ment (if there is no such party or MPs will not submit 
a candidacy for the offi  ce of the prime minister or the 
prime minister does not submit the Cabinet structure 
and does not submit candidacies for offi  ces of Cabinet 
members);
• by a party which is commissioned for this by the 
president (if they fail to accomplish it);
• by the third party which is commissioned for this by 
the president.
In the wording of the 2007 Constitution MPs repre-
senting a party, instead of parties, participate in nomi-
nation of the prime minister.
Parliament:
• approves the structure of the Cabinet proposed by 
the prime minister.
The prime minister, appointed by the president:
• determines the Cabinet structure and submits it to 
parliament’s approval with the president’s consent;
• determines candidacies for offi  ces of Cabinet mem-
bers (except for defense and security) and submits 
them to president’s appointment.
According to the 2007 Constitution, the president ap-
points the prime minister who is nominated by a po-
litical party, not through voting in parliament.  If within 
the established deadline (fi ve days) the candidate for 
the offi  ce of the prime minister is not submitted to the 
president then the president dismisses parliament, 
which for the most part does not even have a right 
to participate in selection and nomination of a prime 
minister. Thus, the Constitution illogically punishes 
the whole parliament and people who elected it be-
cause of the failure of several party list MPs to nomi-
nate a prime minister. The Constitution inconsistently 
punishes parliament for what it is not involved in. 
That is, there is no cause-eff ect relationship between 
dissolution of parliament and actions of parliament.
In 2005, political life did not fl ow in a new direc-
tion of transfer from regionalism to ideological 
contest in politics. Conservative thinking, involv-
ing retrograded populism and world outlooks, 
and the political immaturity of political elite hin-
dered the country from progressive development. 
In many countries, progressive politicians, especially 
some outstanding leaders who had historically short 
terms, performed revolutions in the minds of their 
people and build a new beautiful world for all on that 
basis. Kyrgyzstan also has a chance, but the country is 
allowing it to pass. The system of governance remains 
weak. The political system is in crisis. Confrontation be-
tween the executive branch of authority and the parlia-
ment have attained a permanent, dead-end character. 
The condition of the parliament discredits the model 
of a multiparty system and parliamentary form of rul-
ing in the eyes of the population. Corruption and inef-
fi cient management of public aff airs has destroyed the 
remaining hopes of the population after the change 
of authority. Neither the authority nor the opposi-
tion have a competent, consolidated position on any 
of the principal issue of national or foreign policy. The 
HIPC program demonstrates this state of aff airs best. 
People do not have a leader; they have a tandem. 
There is combative opposition, many-headed and 
many-voiced, which still does not know what kind of 
society to build. In short, the historical ancestry and 
future of the country, the hopes and expectations of 
people are in the hands of an immature political elite. 
Forming of state bodies
Compared to the 1993 Constitution, the Constitution 
of 2007 preserved signifi cant powers of the president 
in forming state bodies and appointing offi  cials. The 
president also dismisses these offi  cials, contradict-
ing the requirement of independence of these bodies 
and their neutrality in carrying out their powers. These 
offi  cials must be dismissed only upon expiration of 
their terms of offi  ce or if they commit serious off ence.
For instance, the Accounting Chamber exercises 
overseeing the legality of state spending use of gold 
reserves and international loans. According to the 
1993 Constitution, it was formed by parliament. 
The constitution of 2006 preserved the approach of 
the 2003 Constitution, whereby the president, with 
parliament’s consent, appoints the chairman of the 
Accounting Chamber who alone appoints one half 
of members of the Accounting Chamber (and dis-
misses them - in the wording of the 2007 Constitu-
tion).  The other half of the members of the Account-
ing Chamber is appointed/elected by parliament.
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The Central Commission for Elections and Referen-
da organizes and conducts elections. According to the 
1993 Constitution, parliament formed the Commission. 
Whereas according to the 2006 Constitution, the presi-
dent with parliament’s consent appoints the chairman of 
the Commission and on his own appoints one half of the 
members of the Commission (and dismisses them - in the 
wording of the 2007 Constitution). Another half of the 
members of the Commission are elected by parliament.
The process of forming courts, compared to the 2006 
Constitution, the Constitution of 2007 excludes the 
National Council of Justice in proposing the presi-
dent candidates for offi  ces of justices of the Consti-
tutional and Supreme Courts for their subsequent 
election in parliament. In other words, the president 
on his own, without participation of the National 
Council, selects candidates of justices for these courts.
Lawmaking
Executive power is concentrated in the hands of the Cab-
inet headed by a prime minister, whereas the legislative 
power rests with parliament. However, diff erent branch-
es of government have powers to infl uence and check 
each other. Thus, the president (Cabinet in parliamenta-
ry or mixed system) may have certain legislative powers.
The Constitutions of 2003, 2006 and 2007 have as-
signed the president substantial legislative powers. 
He has the power to initiate bills, issue decrees, veto 
a bill passed by parliament and return it with his ob-
jections to parliament. If parliament disagrees with 
the president then during reconsideration of this bill 
it should approve a bill in the earlier approved word-
ing by a majority of 2/3, and 3/4 regarding certain bills 
(according to the Constitutions of 2003 and 2007).
Besides this, the president has other legislative pow-
ers. For instance, the president at his own discretion 
can call a referendum, allowing him to pass a decision 
or law opposed by the legislature. Usually this right is 
either limited or absent completely. Limitation of the 
president’s right to call a referendum on changing Con-
stitution is the achievement of the 2007 Constitution 
- the president needs the agreement of 60% of MPs.
Dissolution of parliament is also considered as interfer-
ence in legislative activity. Usually dissolution occurs as 
a last resort when parliament unable to work: unable to 
form a Cabinet or impedes the work of Cabinet by consis-
tently passing a vote of no confi dence. As is well known, 
according to the 2003 Constitution, parliament could 
be dissolved by the president on unlimited grounds - 
“in case of other crisis caused by insurmountable con-
fl icts between parliament and other branches of power.”
The Constitution of 2006 limited the president’s 
power to dissolve parliament only to two cases:
1. when parliament (within three months again) 
chooses to pass a vote of no confi dence in the Cabinet;
2. MPs elected through a party list within 
fi ve days fail to submit a candidate for the of-
fi ce of prime minister to the president. 
In Kyrgyzstan’s history, parliament has never passed a 
vote of no confi dence in the Cabinet (except for 1993 
when the president could dissolve parliament only as 
a result of a referendum), let alone twice within three 
months. On the one hand, this right simply acts as a 
constant threat to the Cabinet and the imaginary 
power of parliament, which will never pass a vote of 
no confi dence threatening its own dissolution. Only 
if the president needs it, and commands a major-
ity in parliament, the president could cause parlia-
ment to self-dissolve (2/3 majority) or pass a vote 
of no confi dence in the Cabinet for the second time. 
On the other hand, as mentioned above, there 
is a paralogism in using the mechanism of dis-
solution in the Constitution: parliament is dis-
solved for what it has not done, without right.
The right to decide how to form and spend the bud-
get of country usually belongs to the highest legisla-
tive body, which at the same time does not have direct 
access to budgetary funds. The Cabinet commands the 
fi nances of the country. Parliament approves the na-
tional budget and a report on its execution, whereas 
the Cabinet develops the national budget and ensures 
its execution. The rule of 2003 Constitution, whereby 
no amendments to the law on national budget, bills 
on taxes, other bills that increase expenditures of the 
national budget or reduce state revenues may be sub-
mitted to parliament and passed without the consent 
of the Cabinet, was preserved in the 2006 Constitution.
The Constitution of 2007 introduced a new provision, 
whereby “bills that entail increasing expenditure of the 
national budget or reducing state revenues may be passed 
by parliament provided there is a source of fi nancing.” In 
that way there is a slight but insuffi  cient strengthening 
of powers of parliament regarding the national budget.
The president’s right to issue decrees that carry the 
force of law is considered a strong interference by the 
president into parliament’s activities. Starting from the 
2006 Constitution, the president cannot issue decrees 
that carry the force of law in the case of parliament’s 
dissolution and parliament no longer delegates its 
legislative powers to the president up to one year.
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“Technical” Cabinet: A Trap for the President of Kyrgyzstan?
As before:
• At his own discretion the president may call a refer-
endum on bills (except for amendments to the Consti-
tution - according to the 2007 Constitution);
• It is diffi  cult to override his veto of a bill;
• Budgetary issues remain under the control of the 
Cabinet (with the amendment of the 2007 Constitu-
tion);
However, the president no longer has such discretion-
ary powers regarding:
• Dissolution of parliament (2006 Constitution) - now it 
depends on the political infl uence of the president;
• The president cannot issue decrees that carry the 
force of law (2006 Constitution);
• Parliament no longer delegates the president its leg-
islative powers (2006 Constitution).
The Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic frequently 
changes but all presidents have fi rmly maintained 
their dominant status vis-à-vis parliament and Cabi-
net. At the same time, presidents sought to cover their 
real powers by “the consent of parliament”, “passing 
a vote of no confi dence on the part of parliament” 
in the Constitution as well as political responsibil-
ity of the prime minister for Cabinet’s performance. 
Namely, the following occurs in the Constitution:
• Variance between large powers of the president, re-
duced powers of parliament and lack of their account-
ability to the people for Cabinet’s policy;
• A weak prime minister, who is more dependent on 
the president and to a lesser extent on parliament but 
at the same time bears great responsibility;
• Weakened parliament due to the signifi cant legisla-
tive powers of the president.
The mechanism of forming the Cabinet became tan-
gled and its implementation in practice will depend on 
the ability of the president to fi nd a common language 
with parliament, which will remain variegated due to 
the eff ect of a mixed electoral system and therefore un-
predictable. Changes to the Constitution have led to the 
preservation of the state machine, which has become 
obsolete, unbalanced and is out of line with the require-
ments of the time. Given the lack of natural resources 
and petrodollars of neighboring states, defi ciencies in 
the system become even more evident and will con-
tinue to strongly infl uence the situation in the country.
The dramatically twisted plot of the confrontation 
between the parliament and Prime Minister has, in 
the end, resulted in the public “death” of the tan-
dem between Bakiev and Kulov. The role of President 
Bakiev, who virtually abandoned his partner, was 
signifi cant in this development, which was followed 
by the quick confi rmation of Azim Isabekov as the 
new head of the Cabinet. Thus, he became the four-
teenth prime minister in the fi fteen-year history of 
“sovereign Kyrgyzstan.” The majority of experts have 
already characterized his role as fi tting within the lim-
its of an elementary executor of the President’s will. 
In this connection, particular attention should be 
paid to the assessment of the possibilities of the 
new Cabinet to respond adequately to the chal-
lenges generated by the diffi  cult economic and po-
litical situation in Kyrgyzstan. Will it be able to re-
spond to the dual tasks demanded of it by President 
Bakiev and the expectations of ordinary citizens?
When analyzing the possible answers to this ques-
tion, it is necessary to assess several likely prospects 
for contemporary Kyrgyzstan. One such prospect 
was defi ned by Felix Kulov, who was bold enough to 
take responsibility for participation in the Heavily In-
debted Poor Countries Initiative. Another way is es-
sentially being defi ned at the moment. Will eff ective 
development be promoted in advance of a critical 
situation, or will there simply be “reactive responses?”
Observation of the initial actions of the Prime Min-
ister, namely his proposed structure of the Cabinet, 
produce a rather negative response. As MPs have 
noted, there is an impression that the structure of 
the Cabinet is made for specifi c individuals, and 
therefore knowingly ineff ective. Thus, we are get-
ting a “new-old Cabinet,” which suff ers from systemic 
fl aws that blocked the work of previous Cabinets.
Special attention should be paid to the following sys-
temic fl aws. First of all, attention should be paid to the 
striking complexity and infl ation of the new Cabinet 
structure. Both the former and the present heads of state 
repeatedly posed the problem of quantitative reduction 
of bureaucracy and its transfer to a higher quality. In 
practice, everything is happening the other way around. 
Instead of eliminating duplicated functions and moving 
Nur Omarov, Professor of Political Science, Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University
“TECHNICAL” CABINET: A TRAP FOR THE PRESIDENT OF KYRGYZSTAN?
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“Technical” Cabinet: A Trap for the President of Kyrgyzstan?
to a transparent and eff ective system of decision-mak-
ing, we are getting a Cabinet where, de facto, no one 
answers for anything. This situation is caused by the fact 
that, instead of some ministries absorbing the “border-
line functions” of other ministries, there is even greater 
fragmentation. This certainly makes them incapable. 
Another problem which vividly characterizes the new 
Cabinet is its age structure. As a rule, the average age 
of previous Cabinet members varied from 55 to 60. 
Notwithstanding the opinion that exactly these years 
are the times of the most wisdom and greatest capac-
ity for work, one should not forgot about the specifi c 
character of our country, due to which the Cabinet 
suff ered from “Soviet conservatism” and only minor 
capacity for conducting real reforms. Therefore, a bar-
rier has been artifi cially created that obstructs the 
way to the instatement of managers of a new genera-
tion who are more adapted to present conditions. A 
direct consequence of this conservatism is an inevi-
table generation gap instead of full-fl edged coopera-
tion. In this regard, Kazakhstan’s example is indicative, 
where, despite the criticism of President Nazarbaev, 
there is a purposeful renewal of the management 
stratum. The average age of Karim Masimov’s Cabinet 
does not exceed 40-45, which is indicative in itself.
Extremely relevant to this point is the problem of pro-
fessional competence and the readiness of the Cabinet 
to execute modern tasks. The system of governance, tra-
ditionally built on the basis of the principle of personal 
loyalty, still rejects everything new, bright and out-
standing. In this sense, it is diffi  cult to refer to the new 
Prime Minister as a reformer who is capable of making 
innovative decisions. The growing principle of appoint-
ments according to kinship and origin complicates this 
problem even more. As a result, it is diffi  cult to expect 
that there will be any qualitative changes in the new 
Cabinet. One may only confi dently assume that broadly 
closed doors for the youth and professionals will remain 
closed. This barrier inevitably leads to the further stag-
nation of the quality of decision making and execution.
The abovementioned triad of systemic fl aws on the fi rst 
level gives way to a number of minor ones, themselves no 
less dangerous. In the aggregate, they produce a healthy 
scepsis in the ability of the Cabinet not only to develop 
“preventive” strategies, but also to act during a crisis.
Such are the “internal” diseases of the new Cabinet, 
which prevent it from achieving the status of an “ef-
fective Cabinet.” While assessing the probable results 
of its activities, it is necessary to consider the “exter-
nal environment” in which it will act. To a great extent, 
this external environment defi nes whether the new 
Cabinet will be “populist,” promoting impracticable 
social expectations, or whether it will choose prag-
matic development through cutting back the social 
package in exchange for investments into the future.
It should be noted that expectations are extremely 
depressing in this regard as well. This is due to the 
multilevel causes that were brought about by the 
“aggressive” political and socio-economic situation.
An obvious recipe for success in the work of any gov-
ernment body is in political stability and predictability, 
which allow for the elaboration of short and medium-
term development strategies for the state. As recent 
years have demonstrated, this circumstance is absent 
in Kyrgyzstan. The outward reconciliation of the presi-
dent with the parliament through the surrender of a 
“disagreeable” Prime Minister is unlikely to last long.
We could suppose the existence of several lines of ten-
sion, due to which “politics will deal with the Prime 
Minister” in the spring. They could be marked as points 
of coincidence in the interests of the population and 
the opposition, which tries to use them. Among these 
points is the latest wording of the Constitution, which is 
of a bluntly authoritarian nature, and therefore does not 
suit the civil society. The “Anti-HIPC” movement, in its dif-
ferent variations, could be added to this list. A likely at-
tempt on the part of Akaev’s supporters to return to the 
political life of the country creates a particular sub-plot.
The fi ndings of a recent study carried out by the In-
stitute for Strategic Analysis and Forecasting (ISAF) of 
the Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University in Bishkek are of 
considerable interest in the assessment of the con-
fl ict-reformative potential of the public. Despite the 
limited number of respondents, these fi ndings give 
an interesting insight into the expectations of the 
population. As noted by ISAF experts, the majority of 
Bishkek residents (over 60%) feel unstable, insecure 
and anxious. Such fi gures are critical and do not rule 
out possibility of protest actions in 2007 due to a rise 
in prices for foodstuff s and energy resources, as well 
as an intensifi cation of the “North vs. South” split.
Analysis of the political moods of Bishkekers dem-
onstrates that the situation in the city, as well as in 
the country as a whole, may well lead to a repetition 
of the events of November 2006 within the next six 
months, if not the events of March 2005. Under cer-
tain conditions, the tension of the protest mood may 
lead to popular unrest similar to the events of 2005.
The main reasons for this uneasy condition are related 
to the economic situation (fl ight of investments, roll-
back of large and medium business, and predominance 
of small business), the internal social and political en-
vironment, and the “prohibitive” migration policies of 
Russia and Kazakhstan. According to the observations 
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“Technical” Cabinet: A Trap for the President of Kyrgyzstan?
of ISAF experts, a critical perception of recent events is 
noted among the NGO sector. One hundred percent of 
respondents noted the “tense” perception of national 
events. However, by omitting positive changes, the ob-
servations of this sector are of an idealized character. 
Only a quarter of surveyed respondents noted any 
improvement of the situation in the political and eco-
nomic spheres of the country during Bakiev’s presiden-
cy. The majority of residents suggest that nothing has 
changed in the country. The responses of civil servants 
are of particular interest. They are largely pessimistic in 
their assessment of changes in political and economic 
spheres. Only ten percent of civil servants suggest that 
there were more or less positive changes in the politi-
cal sphere during the last years, while 41.7% of respon-
dents from this group think that nothing has changed. 
Much of the mood of offi  cials comes down to the con-
dition of uncertainty about their own personal futures. 
It is possible to note commonalities in comparing 
these fi gures with the fi ndings of public opinion polls 
conducted within the last three to four months, such 
as dissatisfaction among the population with the so-
cial and economic situation and with their own eco-
nomic state, with the rampant corruption, and with 
a lack of transparency in decision-making. The over-
infl ated level of expectations set by 24 March 2005 
has led to a situation whereby the majority of gov-
ernment activities are negatively perceived. Given 
the continuing systemic stagnation, will Isabekov’s 
Cabinet be able to solve these problems quickly? 
The answer will be rather negative than positive.
The rate of economic development of the country in 
2006 confi rms the abovementioned points. Kyrgyz-
stan’s GDP increased by 2.7%. This growth was mainly 
due to construction and the service sector. In agricul-
ture, growth stood at 1.5%, whereas industrial output 
decreased by over 10%. When compared against a 
background of negative results in 2005, one may talk 
about a certain growth. However, there is no room for 
particular optimism. For 2006, the President set the task 
of 8% growth, which was certainly assessed skeptically 
by many people. Time confi rmed their skepticism, since 
the goal was not accomplished. According to the esti-
mates of independent experts, one may talk about fi rm 
economic growth if there is a 5% increase in GDP. Lack 
of such an increase in GDP means failure of the authori-
ties to understand the causes of the economic crisis.
Reportedly, our rate of economic development turned 
out to be the lowest in the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States. Even in Ukraine and Georgia, coun-
tries that went through “color revolutions,” there was 
a 6.7%-8.6% increase in GDP. This comparison is a 
direct testimony to existence of other reasons for 
low economic growth within Kyrgyzstan. Foremost 
among these reasons are corruption and lawless-
ness, which prevent the development of any “rules 
of the game” that would be universal for everyone. 
According to experts, this circumstance has been 
brought about directly by the system, which is built 
on excessive concentration of authority in one hand. 
The year 2007 also does not give any grounds for op-
timism. Crises forecasted in the political sphere, along 
with the growing social activity of citizens, are not likely 
to promote internal consolidation and unity. The expres-
sion of concern by businesses with regard to the safety 
of their property and assets is a disturbing trend. Secu-
rity is one of the main issues in planning investmfents. 
With -36, we are lagging behind other Central Asian 
states. Members of the International Business Coun-
cil (IBC) have noted that the country has not achieved 
the necessary level of stability. According to the IBC, 
there have been no real reforms in Kyrgyzstan so far.
These problems will be exacerbated by the expected 
return of at least 100,000 labor migrants from Rus-
sia and the closing of internal markets for foreign 
entrepreneurs. Together, these factors will result in 
additional diffi  culties, not only for regular citizens, 
but for the entire “social economy” of Kyrgyzstan.
The growing activity of radical Islamists should be at-
tributed to a diff erent group of challenges, more or 
less related to those previously mentioned. According 
to experts, out of all Central Asian republics, Kyrgyz-
stan is currently the most favorable site for the activi-
ties of radical Islamists. If the state does not come up 
with an adequate “state-religion strategy,” there is a 
high probability for the radicalization and destabili-
zation of the country as a whole. While assessing the 
situation, it is necessary to note that a seeming calm 
masks a loud explosion, since a regrouping and build-
up of the strength of Islamists is occurring in reality. 
Whether the new Cabinet will be able to do anything 
in this direction given the elapsing time is a mat-
ter that directly infl uences the future of the country.
Summing up, it is important to note the following 
points: For the success of the reforms declared by the 
new leadership of Kyrgyzstan, it is vitally important 
to have several components. These key components 
include the availability of an “eff ective Cabinet,” au-
tonomous of the president, political stability based 
on national unity, and an independent judiciary, 
which precludes corruption. Together, these fac-
tors would allow the creation of a basis for the con-
struction of a rationally designed, eff ective state.
While assessing the possibility of creating an “eff ective 
Cabinet” as a derivative of the concept of an “eff ective 
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state,” it is important to turn to international experience. 
According to scholars, the main function of an “eff ective 
state” should be the promotion, determination and accel-
eration of those structural changes which are necessary 
for long-term growth and elevation to a higher level of so-
cial development. The state should remain in the center of 
the economic and social spheres. However, it is important 
to reevaluate the role of the state. It should not occupy the 
position of the main actor in making and implementing de-
cisions. On the contrary, it should act as a partner, catalyst 
and regulator of changes. That is why an “eff ective Cabinet” 
must realize what constitutes our “national interests” and 
motivate the rest of the population towards the attainment 
of these national interests. Orientation towards ensuring 
balance between economic growth and social and po-
litical stability will facilitate success in reforming the state.
Will Isabekov’s Cabinet have such an understanding of its 
role and be able to implement it in practice? The entire 
logic of the abovementioned points prompts a negative 
answer. Virtual subordination to the president and the 
force majeur conditions of “post-revolutionary develop-
ment” leave an extremely narrow corridor for the Cabi-
net’s activities. We will most likely not get a full-fl edged 
strategy for the development of a competitive economy 
that is able to consistently meet the expectations of or-
dinary citizens. Most probable is the continuation of pre-
vious trends that are based on strengthening the pres-
ent day “consumption economy,” directly benefi ting cer-
tain groups of politicians and entrepreneurs close to the 
president. In practice, this situation entails the preserva-
tion of the previous diseases of the economy, the grad-
ual expansion of the gap in the incomes and interests of 
social strata, a high degree of dependence on external 
investments, and chronically crisis-prone development.
However, there is one very signifi cant diff erence from 
the old times in this situation. If it was possible to talk 
about a “just president” and an “incompetent Cabi-
net” previously, now, when the Cabinet is completely 
dependent on the head of the state, such gradations 
and illusions disappear. This means that the presi-
dent, having monopolized political and executive 
powers, will have to assume the main responsibil-
ity and criticism for any unpopular and fl awed steps 
made by his protégé Isabekov. Therefore, a “pleasant 
neighborhood” turns into a trap for the president, 
which will be increasingly diffi  cult for him to avoid.
Valentin Bogatyrev, Coordinator of the Analytical Consortium “Perspectiva“
SOME POLITICAL OUTCOMES OF 2006
Two parallel processes defi ne today’s devel-
opment of political situation in Kyrgyzstan. 
The fi rst one is related with politi-
cal formation of President Bakiev. 
It needs to be recalled that when Bakiev reached 
power in after March 24, he had a very low level of 
legitimacy. State authority in general and President’s 
authority in particular lost its sanctity and respect. 
The authority of the President was very low, and ver-
tical power of the executive branch of the authority 
ended behind the doors of the Kyrgyz White House. 
But this was not the most dangerous thing for 
Bakiev. A bigger threat to Bakiev’s authority was 
posed by his surrounding, which was created in 
an urgent mode. Neither Prime Minister nor oth-
er high offi  cials were a part of Bakiev’s team. 
It was some kind of forced political agreement 
for Bakiev; otherwise he would not be able to 
keep power in the hands and stabilize the situa-
tion in the country. Bakiev understood it perfectly.
But he also realized that such situation cannot last 
forever. He was ready to strengthen his author-
ity; the only question was to choose the right mo-
ment to do it with minimum of political damage. 
Seeing how easily and accurately has Bakiev 
used his chances recently, it is clear that Baki-
ev turned out to be more subtle and strong 
politician compared to how he is perceived. 
The fi rst opportunity emerged in the spring of the last 
year when opposition demanded dismissal of several 
people from the President’s surrounding. It was the 
best situation. The list of dismissed people turned out 
shorter than what opposition demanded, but those dis-
missed had ambitions for power, though not all of them. 
The second phase of strengthening the presidential au-
thority was related with constitutional reforms. Again, 
opposition did the whole job, helping the President. 
  
The fi rst edition of the constitution, adopted on No-
vember 8, already strengthened President’s pow-
ers signifi cantly, compared to powers, which he 
had before. Political skills of Presidential pool in 
this political operation deserve the highest grade, 
compared to those who were better on the square. 
But this was not a climax yet. The major point was the 
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December edition of the constitution. The process 
brought two positive results for Bakiev: strengthening 
of presidential powers and formation of sustainable 
pro-presidential majority in the Parliament. The latter 
was more than surprising after November rebellion of 
MPs who were previously obedient to the President. 
Finally any political technologist can be delight-
ed by how President solved the issue with Kulov. 
I do not have doubts that Bakiev sincerely intended 
to work with Felix Kulov. If it was not so, it cost him 
nothing not to nominate Kulov at all, or second time. 
But again there was an obstacle to the Prime Minister 
in the form of Parliament opposition. The Parliament 
did not want to excuse several mistakes of the Prime 
Minister, fi rst of all, his very strange scornful and conde-
scending attitude to the legislative branch of authority. 
Everyone remember his words: “MPs are like children...” 
Such attitude was particularly strange because Ku-
lov repeatedly posed himself as a supporter of the 
Parliamentary form of governance and even sub-
mitted his own version of the constitution, where 
the Parliament was given a key role in the system 
of authority. It could mean only one thing: Ku-
lov supported the Parliamentary form of govern-
ment only for political purposes, no more than that. 
The last drop, of course, was the stance of Prime Minis-
ter regarding the issue of the Parliament’s dissolution. 
The problem was not this stance as such (most of presi-
dential surrounding had the same opinion) but the fact 
that a formally trained lawyer, very experienced politi-
cal fi gure, who had been a victim of voluntary treat-
ment of law in past, was so easily able to go against the 
law for rather psychological than political frustration. 
    
Also, the Prime Minister did not take into ac-
count that it was a historically another Parliament, 
not the same as the one dissolved a decade ago. 
Kulov’s position on Kyrgyzstan’s entrance to the 
HIPC might not be the reason, but still was an argu-
ment. Noteworthy, the fact that he recalled his sig-
nature under government’s agreement with condi-
tions on joining the HIPC makes one thing of insin-
cerity, some sort of a game of the Prime Minister, 
just like with the parliamentary form of governance. 
Anyway, with resignation of Kulov featured another phase 
of strengthening the President’s powers. One can say that 
right now Bakiev became the President of the country. 
This process was politically logi-
cal enough, and positive for the country. 
Firstly, we could not have a President without a full 
Presidential authority. It was not a normal situation.
Secondly, strengthening of presidential authority will 
speed up process of state authority restoration in general; 
the defi cit of power is dangerous, especially in our country. 
Thirdly, we will more likely get what we need most: a 
Presidential team, which will work on goals which the 
President puts forward. And we will have a real opportu-
nity to evaluate the President and his team, without any 
references to the surrounding of President hindering the 
work of President. Some three more appointment deci-
sions and no one will be an ‘obstacle’ to the President. 
Many people fear that the process of 
strengthening the President’s powers will 
turn the country back to authoritarianism. 
But, fi rstly, it would be naive to believe that any 
President, whatever is his name, would be ready 
reduce own powers. One comes to power not for 
that purpose. More than that, recently we can hear 
from the most committed democrats that what 
this country needs is a dictator, a strong hand. 
Well, with one condition: an enlightened dictator. 
Secondly, return to authoritarianism is possible only 
when there is no one to resist. It is not our case. The Kyr-
gyz society passed a critical point to return to its own tra-
ditions of freedom, and people will never let themselves 
turn into slaves of a system, not mentioning of a ruler. 
The second process, which we are witnessing, is re-
lated to the formation of a new power status and 
new role of the Parliament. The process started in 
last days of March 2005, signifying another revolu-
tion, maybe more important that the power change. 
Its leader and organizer was another representative 
of the South - Omurbek Tekebaev. As many other 
politicians who had been in opposition to Akaev 
for many years, he could not miss such a chance, 
provided by departure of the first President. He be-
came the Speaker of the Parliament and literally 
started living in a Parliamentary republic. His posi-
tion and opinion on the structure of authority in 
the country started changing the role of the Parlia-
ment in the political system of the country. His per-
sonal critical attitude to Bakiev also played role. 
Tekebaev started generating a new attitude 
of the Parliament towards President, govern-
ment on a daily basis. More than that, he initi-
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Roundtable transcript 
KYRGYZSTAN IN 2006: ACHIEVEMENTS, LESSONS AND PERSPECTIVES
Date: January 11, 2007 
Location: Institute for Public Policy 
Moderator: Muratbek Imanaliev, president of the Institute for Public Policy 
Roundtable participants:
1. Ishenbai Abdurazakov – Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of the Kyrgyz Republic
2. Sultan Mederov – Advisor for the Executive Director of Marka Audit Ltd 
3. Valentin Bogatyrev –Coordinator of the Analytical Consortium “Perspectiva“
4. Bakyt Beshimov – Vice-President of the AUCA
5. Erlan Abdyldaev - Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of the Kyrgyz Republic
6. Zainidin Kurmanov – National Consultant of the Parliamentary Reform Component of the Democratic 
Governance UNDP Program 
7. Nurlan Sadykov – Director of the Institute for Constitutional Policy 
8. Elmira Nogoibaeva – senior expert of International Institute for Strategic Research under the President of KR
9. Tamerlan Ibraimov – Director of the Political and Legal Research Center
10. Ulan Sarbanov – former Chair of the KR National Bank
Muratbek Imanaliev:  Today we met to discuss the 
situation in our country. Perhaps your statements today 
will draw public interest and your words will be taken 
into consideration. Our country has lived through a very 
interesting, tumultuous and unpredictable year in 2006. 
There were plenty of events; I am always surprised at the 
amount of information produced by such a small country 
as Kyrgyzstan – more than by India or China. The world 
looks at us with amazement. My international colleagues 
approach me with questions trying to understand what 
is taking place in this country. Frankly speaking, we 
ourselves can not always answer those questions. Every 
day new political constructions appear and break within 
the hour. A big game with the Constitution was initiated. 
But as in other countries, Constitutional Reform in 
our country turned into a redistribution of authority. 
Politicians and all the people working on it forgot that 
the main purpose of the Constitution was to form a legal 
framework, wherein the Constitution would be a key and 
a main ruling element; that the Constitutional Reform did 
not only foresee the adoption of the Constitution but the 
creation of corresponding institutes and mechanisms 
that would turn the Constitution into a main law, 
defi ning and regulating the whole legal life of the state.
I picture the current situation as follows: with the eff orts 
of many people we created a space for the absurd. I said 
before that offi  cials in our country did not have politics 
but I have recently come to the conclusion that it does 
exist; it is the politics of the absurd, unfortunately. 
Therefore, today I would like to discuss this situation. 
Bakyt Jolchubekovich, what do you think of the events of 
2006 and the opportunities and expectations for 2007?
 
Bakyt Beshimov: I am grateful to the Institute for the 
invitation. Before answering the question, I would 
like to emphasize that I have read all IPP articles, the 
articles of Valentin Bogatyrev and I liked all of your 
ideas, especially the one concerning a two-tiered 
system of government. In general, ideas about political 
philosophy and the products of intellectual activities on 
state development are hardly in demand in Kyrgyzstan. 
In Russia, Belarus and in Baltic states they are needed 
during strategic decisions, making processes and 
implementation of development objectives, but they 
are absolutely unnecessary for our country. Statements 
about 2006 being a new start raise doubts with me. I 
could say something similar about 2005 but that would 
ated and, initially led, the process of changing
the legal foundations, the constitutional reform. 
It is understandable that his position and policy collid-
ed with the existing system. Ant it was quite logical that 
Tekebaev had to pay for his actions by resignation from 
the Speaker’s position and being a victim of blackmailing.
Still, both things had results. The most impor-
tant one was a formation of de-facto new Parlia-
ment. Tekebaev, talking high language, burned a 
sparkle, which started fl ame of November riot of 
the Parliament against the President and Decem-
ber riot of the Parliament against the government. 
Thus, talking about political outcomes of 2006, 
we should not only see confl icts and mistakes, 
but also realize that this year brought us se-
rous, in some way, fundamental political changes. 
Consequences of last year events will manifest in 
the nearest future and manifest signifi cantly. In the 
fi rst place, it will occur in the framework of prepa-
ration for Parliamentary elections according to the 
new system. Signifi cance of the event is hard to 
overestimate. It is already clear that this issue will 
be determined not by constitutional terms but by 
the readiness of main political forces for elections.
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be informed by emotional perceptions. There were 
hopes and expectations although I was ironical towards 
upcoming changes. Now I cannot say that 2006 made a 
new start. There are no legitimate reasons to expect new 
changes – those that exist are illusions. It is a repetition 
of an old situation but in a new form. There are two 
political agents now: central power and opposition. Can 
they address a question: what development model for 
Kyrgyzstan do they see – post socialistic, nationalistic, 
liberal or what? Neither power nor opposition can give 
an answer. You, Muratbek Sansyzbaevich, have made a 
good point that present here today are representatives 
of diff erent movements: democratic, liberal and 
conservative.  However their approaches and ideas 
belong more to the sphere of theory rather than as 
foundations for active policy. (I personally see the state 
gradually moving along the liberal path). In other words, 
I see that opposition and central power do not know 
what development direction the country should choose. 
They start conversations about state development 
paths and end up sorting out relationships. Since long 
ago Kyrgyz people used to say “chyr chatak” (brawl) 
– which is a precise description but it is not for politics. 
The famous statement of the President is based on a 
thoroughly developed constructive logic that does 
not even nearly correspond to the vision of the people 
that have communicated and commented on it. They 
read it, put it aside and forgot about it. Look at the 
opposition: part of it says that their expectations did 
not come true, but most of it is personifi ed. Today the 
actions of the opposition demonstrate no intention to 
create any political philosophy or to clarify the path 
of development. Think about those people that have 
identifi ed themselves with the opposition for a long 
time, and now after receiving power and a signifi cant 
role in decision making processes act the same as 
their former opponents or worse. What does it show? 
It is not about their personal qualities. It says that 
political philosophy does not exist as a basic product 
among Kyrgyz political ruling circles. It is a sphere of 
thought, but not the product of specifi c politics. In 
this regard, Islam Karimov has more clarity: he agrees 
that he is building state capitalism. Nazarbaev states 
that he is building a liberal, pragmatic society wherein 
he restrains competition in politics and promotes the 
development of economics. So some frameworks exist.
Today I read on the Internet that Kyrgyzstan is a country 
that cannot exist independently. Ruefully, I agree with 
it because the political elite here has a relativist nature.
Valentin Bogatyrev: All that is correct. But I can disagree 
with some points. Today I will try to understand what 
processes are taking place and are born in this country. 
Two important things are related to the year 2006. The 
fi rst: an attempt to enter a strategic space was taken. 
Especially during the last year we spoke a lot about who 
we were, what we were, why and where we were going. 
These issues strongly concern people at all levels and in all 
territories. But that has yet to become the main concept 
of state development because offi  cials have not defi ned 
for themselves whether these concepts were actually 
needed. The fact that society is asking these questions 
signifi es that sooner or later it will fi nd an answer. That 
became the biggest success of the year 2006. It could 
lead to a better outcome but everyone, including us, is to 
blame for the fact that it did not happen. It is not power 
that defi nes what to do and how things will turn out 
– but the elite. However, today power does not include 
the elite; the elite is not in power. There are few such 
people but they do exist and they have such a will that 
can drive the situation forward. I have the least number 
of complaints to central power because they are what 
they are. It is the business of politicians to lash onto it.
And the second important thing: in 2006 for the fi rst 
time we acquired a political space, space for politics. 
For the fi rst time, political institutes were granted an 
opportunity to work in this space. I should point out 
that various forces have behaved diff erently in this 
situation. I can say that it was a complete failure when 
the Government demonstrated that it was absolutely 
incapable of building political relations. Moreover, it 
endeavored to take everything back into a pre-political 
era: Parliament dismissal, HIPC. Kulov says “I do not 
want to work with this Parliament”. I do not understand 
how the Prime Minister would not want to work with 
the Parliament? Why would it matter which Parliament 
he worked with? There is a Parliament as it is and 
tomorrow it will be no better, if not worse. The New 
Parliament will be more independent and for Kulov to 
seek control over it will only be worse. The Government 
showed its inability to work with political technologies. 
In this term, the President demonstrated a better 
ability and a desire to work in the political space. I say 
this because he resolved the situation using political 
technologies twice – in spring and in November. In 
both cases he managed to settle a political situation.
Moreover, I tell everyone that for this year we 
have made a big step forward in speaking about 
democracy and politics. We may have made four 
steps backwards in some aspects, six steps to the side, 
eight around, but there is one big step forward; that 
is the resolution of the issue over the participation 
of parties in Parliament formation and the refusal 
of the Prosecutor’s arrest. These are the two biggest 
successes although they did not quite follow the recipe. 
What I say now might seem as utopia for you. A new type 
of democracy is being formed –a type I call consensus-
based. In other words based on traditional canons, 
democracy is the power of the majority, while consensus-
based democracy is the power of agreement, power 
of negotiation. It is not a rule of law but negotiation 
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wherein the subject is not an individual and his rights, 
but a clan and family. In my mind, Kyrgyzstan is building 
this very democracy. I was asked to say more about this 
democracy in Germany but I think that such democracy 
as a foundation is possible only for Asian states. But the 
most important that change of elites did not take place in 
2006. These are people with soviet minds not empowered 
nor willing to master democratic technologies. That is the 
largest issue at present. But I hope tomorrow or by 2010 
this change will occur and then we will be able say that 
power is listening to us, understanding and has a will.
Sultan Mederov: Consensus-based democracy – is it 
good or bad? 
Valentin Bogatyrev: I think it is neither good nor bad. 
It is a method of social regulation. 150 years ago we lost 
it because of a diff erent management system unusual 
to us, with a diff erent culture, diff erent stereotypes of 
interaction and diff erent values were introduced, and 
150 years ago we received an education strange for 
us. And consensus-based democracy is a return to old 
cultural foundations inherent to this society. That is what 
makes them important. And let them call it tribalism 
but that is a method that allowed the Kyrgyz people to 
survive for centuries and to live through this year too. 
That is so. Particularly in critical situations, clans have 
negotiated with each other and the situation would be 
resolved. Whether it is good or bad is another question. I 
just see that it is a functioning mechanism and it works.
Muratbek Imanaliev: Is there a possibility of 
“exhumation” of principles and mechanisms of 
consensus-based democracy that existed in the 
past? Historical memory stores details but does 
not store mechanisms as in case with the aksakal 
courts. I would like to support Valentine Borisovich: 
consensus-based democracy does not in any way 
deny the universal principle of democracy because 
the majority is replaced by public agreements, which, 
may be more important. And it does not matter which 
way – more important is that it leads to harmony and 
agreement, which is a prerequisite for development. 
And that concerns even such countries as China.
Valentin Bogatyrev: One can say that harmony 
and agreement are the foundations of development 
only in China and in no other countries. In my 
opinion, the driving force of development is confl ict.
Muratbek Imanaliev: If confl ict is a paradox with 
inconsistent conditions then yes. But the paradox is that 
any confl ict leads to a search for harmony and agreement. 
But it may happen that confl ict will lead to an absolutely 
diff erent side and go beyond the limits of harmony.
Elmira Nogoibaeva: I agree with all who have spoken 
and disagree only with the researchers of the Moscow 
State Institute of International Relations that stated 
that Kyrgyzstan is second place in the list of collapsing 
states after Chad. It is not clear what indicators were 
used during the research and why would Uzbekistan 
and Afghanistan have more capacity? I think that 
researchers had limited information and based their 
fi ndings on what Russia currently wanted to see.
The second is lack of elite. All models are viewed from the 
point of view of values. I think that not values but political 
sociology and hierarchy should serve as a starting point. 
If we are to build democracy then one should remember 
that a democratic state is one of the most hierarchical 
ones considering democratic procedures that foresee 
stratifi cation of the society. Our elite are fairly unique. It 
exists – as intellectual, family, clan and regional types. I 
agree that the elite in topological terms does not change 
and development of the elite is behind the development 
of events. If we are talking about the resolution of crisis 
situations then we should speak about the creation of a 
quality elite. Its mechanisms are prescribed –moreover 
that they are not practiced just as communications. I 
am not sure about communicational democracy but 
we, defi nitely, do not have a communicational elite. 
Speaking about events occurring in the country 
then I do not see them in a negative aspect. It 
seems to me that an elite hierarchy is forming 
now that in future will gradually enhance things.
Bakyt Beshimov: I would like to emphasize that in 1989 
when we were part of the USSR our GDP per capita was 
7.5 thousand dollars. Today we have 480 dollars but each 
year we make declarations about six and 10 percent 
economic growth. Look at our results – they are similar 
to those of Moldova, Armenia and Tajikistan but these 
states came out of serious and deep crisis, surviving 
civil wars with losses calculated in thousands and the 
destruction of infrastructure. I have a feeling that we have 
also been going through some war for fi fteen years. We 
can talk about anything we want, that we should eat and 
somehow exist, but meanwhile the average Kyrgyzstani 
does not have any opportunity and that is why over 20% 
of citizens have left the country, and continue to leave.
Muratbek Imanaliev: Issue of our development has 
always been multi faceted. The main mistake during 
the construction of the state was in my opinion when 
the cart was put in front of the horse. We were not 
only supposed to create a democratic but also a legal 
state. And on our own experience we have learnt that 
democracy does not produce a rule of law as such. 
Considering the experiences of other countries as well 
it is necessary to state that democracy cannot develop 
simultaneously with the law. A legal state should be 
created regardless whether it is authoritarian or not.
Tamerlan Ibraimov: The fact that we are talking about 
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negative aspects now does not mean that we do not 
believe in our country. We often try to nullify those 
negative phenomena that exist in a society. Regarding the 
ratio of democracy and legal status I would like to argue 
that a totalitarian state and a legal one are not that similar, 
and the existence of legislature and its implementation 
does not speak for the presence of a legal state.
One of the negative outcomes of 2006 is that the elites 
did not manage to fi nd mechanisms for negotiation; 
the rules have never been created. We observed an 
attempt to create formal rules in the implementation 
of the Constitutional Reform.  Here we saw that the 
political elite had neither procedures nor formats, 
including content, to agree on. The constitutional 
process is complicated and challenging and most 
likely the opposition will soon undertake some action.
Now we are not speaking about quality since a 
political elite exists in any country. We also have our 
own political elite because we are in the early stages 
of democracy. There is a diff erent question: to what 
extent has our political elite grown in a qualitative 
way since the independence of Kyrgyzstan. The main 
confl ict is that we are building capitalism and trying 
hard to hold on to collective values. I agree that we 
should follow social and cultural values but concurrently 
with the rules of a market economy. Until we resolve 
issue with property and outline the rules regulating 
resolution of issue, we will continue foundering. 
And it would be preferable to document these rules.
I would also like to underline the issue of political 
persecution of our own opponents upon victory or 
loss. We are witnessing it now and see that this activity 
in our country is acquiring criminal forms and it seems 
to me that a criminal nature will for some time prevail 
in our politics, which might lead to new confl icts.
The formed or unformed state of Kyrgyzstan is not 
a political question. I think that Kyrgyzstan has the 
capacity to resolve the challenging situation. Currently 
we use a dialectic: we run here and there. We will not 
stay long in authoritarianism – we do not have those 
resources that our neighbors have, fortunately. Because 
of abundant resources, power can easily deal with the 
opposition. In this respect we have a chance, because 
being incapable of repressing the opposition our power 
is forced to seek compromises with it. Let it happen in 
2010, where we will be able to solve our issues gradually, 
not in a revolutionary, but evolutionary manner.
Muratbek Imanaliev: Based on the information I have, 
the Eastern Asian region is a place of creation of new 
ideological forms of democracies that are diffi  cult to 
understand for many. For me the more important issue 
lies in the effi  ciency of these mechanisms. Such Eastern 
Asian states as Japan and China are fast developing 
ones. And I think it is worthwhile that our Kyrgyz 
scientists take a close look at processes occurring there.
Nurlan Sadykov: I would like to continue discussion 
about a greater priority: rule of law or democracy. All 
these years we have focused on de-concentration of 
state power (and that was a fairly deep thought for 
that time) and we wanted to build our democracy 
on it. Extensive works have been conducted with 
local government bodies. Therefore, we forgot about 
democratic institutes that are self-regulatory, while 
we should have held deeper reforms. That is vital. 
Based on the results of those reforms, possibly we 
will end up with a consensus-based democracy.
There is always a dispute on what is more important: 
public or private interests. That is also a problem for 
us because representatives of liberal democracy argue 
that private interests should be developed. But the 
key is to strike the balance because public interests 
also exist. Not all of our citizens can start their own 
business and besides Asian conditions, there are purely 
Kyrgyz ones. We cannot automatically project liberal 
values on to Kyrgyz reality and it should be done with 
certain limits. Finding those limits is our objective.
Will we survive till 2010 with fall-winter Constitutions? 
Within only two months we have already stepped 
twice on the same rakes. With a lack of coordination 
between parties we rush to make important political 
decisions. Last year the President has passed a strategy 
for public policy development. But previous steps 
demonstrate that public policy technologies are not 
applied at a high level. Regardless of the content of 
this Constitution it should go through independent 
expertise. This year the irresponsible behavior of the 
Government has shocked everyone which, speaking 
about successes and achievements, has fi nally self-
dissolved. And I think that the President took a 
great responsibility upon himself: to remain without 
the Government or Parliament. Thus, a vacuum is 
created in which we will not be able to live until 2010.
On the other hand, if legal prerequisites for forming a new 
Parliament and Government are formed, I am afraid our 
electoral system, that is an echo of the past, will create a 
new confl ict. When eff ective and constructive interaction 
is absent, elections could turn into something even worse 
than the events of the 2005 elections. The constitution 
should be directed on building strong power institutions, 
with a good, open and transparent electoral system.
Muratbek Imanaliev: I do not see attempts to 
cultivate the concept of power division; there is not 
even an understanding of what it is. Disagreements 
between the President and Parliament end up with the 
redistribution of authority and who will get the most. I 
call the situation absurd because now the legislative 
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branch of power does not exist. A strange situation 
occurred. Based on people’s experience and successes 
we are yet to learn to see diff erences and distinguish 
positive from negative. Unfortunately, that is how it is.
Ishenbai Abdurazakov: We easily speak about 
independence. In the West there are grounds to talk 
about it but there the judicial branches are under 
mutual control; and they have public opinion and 
media. And who should provide evaluation of the 
judicial power here? Judicial power lives its own life 
here and the more independent it is – the worse.
Nurlan Sadykov: Yes, that is so. What is the Supreme 
Court Chair liable for? Nothing. Judges should be trained. 
Ishenbai Abdurazakov: In developed countries 
awards for work, professionalism and public control 
create incentive. But here they are the weakest aspects. 
What happens? Professionalism is decreasing, level 
of training is drastically low, effi  cient control is absent 
and moral codes are weakened. Even salary increases 
will not help. They will continue to take bribes.
Nurlan Sadykov: In comparison with Soviet times our 
judicial power although independent is irresponsible. 
The penal session of the Supreme Court is not 
functioning, there is not a consistent law-enforcement 
practice and everything comes out of mercantile 
interests and the subjective approaches of judges.
Zainidin Kurmanov: Let’s come back to consensus-
based democracy. Maybe it suits some but not us. In 
the past, eff orts were made to put on a French tuxedo 
on a Kyrgyz nomad. And we unsuccessfully tried to 
combine classic smocking and the Kyrgyz kolpak, 
wearing them simultaneously. One cannot expect 
more from these elites. Only some educated parts 
of society hold conversations about democracy and 
democratic values and continues to master this science.
Offi  cials act by principle “rush without hurry” and focus 
on operational daily issues. Issues usually occur when 
you do not know what is in the “black box”. But there is a 
well-tested bureaucratic method when the government 
knows what is in the “box” and deals with ongoing routine 
activities – what if that takes us somewhere? We have 
the brightest example of a product of the bureaucratic 
state. We are not happy with this government because 
instead of rapidly developing and running reforms we 
do not see the need for it and handle everyday work.
Fifteen years ago we found ourselves in a strange 
democratic space and selected democracy as 
Elmira Nogoibaeva wrote, not because of its 
values but because we had no other alternative.
But as Bakyt Jolchubekovich stated, in 1991 there was a 
start but it did not occur on March 24th in 2005. As soon 
as the new government came it started reverting, trying 
old clothing on us but society has grown out of this cloth, 
which led to the permanent crisis that we see now. And 
offi  cials do not see ways of resolving this crisis. It would 
be enough for the President to take a step towards the 
people and say: “Folks, you want democracy? You will 
get it”. Civil Society is not asking more from him. But 
his vocabulary lacks the word “democracy”. He is part 
of that elite that considers perestroika (reorganization) 
to be a mistake, views democracy as a mistake and 
believe that democrats are to blame for the collapse 
of the USSR, and it is simply impossible to prove him 
wrong. That makes him very similar to Nazarbaev.
What can we build independently? Only a Khanate. 
That is how Turkmens have built a khanate without 
interference and assistance of the international society. 
Due to the presence of international organizations we 
are not rolling down to the bottom of a deep abyss. 
We can only make what we are good at. We are good 
at making kumys (fermented mare’s milk), we are the 
best in making maksym-shoro (Kyrgyz national drink), 
we have no competition in horse riding – in other words 
we should stay as Kyrgyz with our own habits and 
traditions. Valentin Bogatyrev was right stating that we 
should go back to cultural roots when we lived by rules 
that made sense to everyone. Now we live in an agrarian 
society that cannot produce democracy. Therefore we 
need some alternative democracy. Consensus-based 
democracy worked well in the Kyrgyz commune. Forty 
tribes and families – how did they reach consensus? 
Only through coordination. Kenesary Kasymov attacked 
the Kyrgyz land – the Kyrgyz combined their eff orts, 
elected a Khan and fought off  the Kazakhs and then 
broke up; as danger appears – the Kyrgyz combine 
their eff orts again, fi ght off  and break up. And that 
was an accepted practice – no one felt disadvantaged. 
I agree that political philosophy is necessary because 
digging into the past we will fi nd plenty of values that 
united the Kyrgyz and distinguished us as an ethnos. 
Muratbek Sansyzbaevich is right; we should take a closer 
look at the history of Asian states prospering without 
democracy. But they had, have and will have a political 
philosophy and none of them intends to exchange their 
philosophy for democracy  Instead they are incorporating 
it into their value system. We have neither values nor 
democracy. And the President suggests building an 
economy without all of it. How can you build it without 
moral values? We will only build a bandit market economy 
where private property is not protected, human rights 
are not observed and courts are not liable. And that 
is what the new or old political elite off er us, but we 
have already gone through it. One shall not ignore our 
experience of 15 years. Agreement is a sign of liberalism 
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that considers the interests of all public groups. Western 
values that are close and understandable to us should 
be integrated into our cultural roots. How are power and 
opposition resolving disagreements? Using force. But 
before, the Kyrgyz have never solved issues applying 
force. We did not even practice capital punishment; 
instead we had a ransom. Resolution of questions and 
disputes came by common sense because our ancestors 
understood that the Kyrgyz people might become 
extinct if people were killed. But our politicians have 
learnt well the bolshevik principle – to trample down and 
to destroy. We should just revisit our values according 
to our national specifi cities. Now everything is strange: 
values are western and we are unaccustomed to them. 
All projects should turn into national ones and we should 
accumulate our own cultural experience and apply it.
Muratbek Imanaliev: Some say that Kyrgyz people 
are not ready for what Zainidin Karpekovich is 
suggesting. But it seems to me that we can start from 
elections. Let’s organize them fairly although fairness 
is a value and should be supported by legal and 
humanitarian mechanisms. And I think by saying “we 
are not ready for democracy” we really mean that we 
are not ready for fairness. Elections without bribes, 
massive drink treatments, militia – is it possible?
Zainidin Kurmanov: The term “power” in Eastern 
peoples was more a moral concept rather than power 
or a political attribute. The Kyrgyz Code of Honor stated 
that a person with bad deeds in the past that let his 
nation run wild cannot become a governor. The head 
of the Kyrgyz people was always a role model and 
an ethical leader. And that very tribalism that we are 
working hard on abolishing is a certain social institute 
of protection. It would be a question of delegating a 
representation in a certain body or institute. And the 
most respectable, the most honorable person from the 
family would be delegated. Recently conferences have 
been held that were attended by fi ve Deputies from 
India. And everyone felt their aristocratic origin, and in 
India they practice consensus based democracy and 
each teip had sent his representative. All Deputies are 
sons of dukes with excellent education, speaking English 
and Russian and dressed in business suits: The classic 
example. In other words everything can be changed.
Elmira Nogoibaeva: In my opinion we are idealizing 
democracy that is in reality a mercantile and individualistic 
type of society. When we are busy self-reproaching and 
expressing discontent with our elite it always raises a 
question with me: comparing the personas of the U.S.A, 
Israel and Kyrgyzstan, it is hard to say which one of 
them is of a better “quality”. I do not have a feeling that 
everything is bad, of poor quality and undeveloped here. 
The more I research our society the more I reaffi  rm it.
Zainidin Kurmanov: An elite exists but here we represent 
more an art, scientifi c and technical elite. And the matter 
is of the political elite. We have a regional one, but lack 
a national one. Whatever we say about Askar Akaev, he 
was a leader of national scope and all candidates running 
for President looked immature, and the leaders against 
him were of a regional but not national scope. Kyrgyz 
separate power into ‘ours and theirs’. And now we need to 
transform their power into ours and that transformation 
is failing. Northerners perceive the south as theirs, just as 
before, Southerners perceived the power of Akaev not to 
be theirs. Our country does not only have dual, but multi 
power, especially because the President lacks ideological 
guiding principles. Our politicians are unpredictable.
Muratbek Imanaliev: Kyrgyzstan does not have an 
intellectual and political elite because it is not about 
a group of well\-educated and well-dressed people. 
The elite is represented by generators of constructive 
nation-wide ideas. The same people that we identify as 
the political and intellectual elite are apologists of ideas, 
and the values of others, but that is not liberalism. And a 
military elite does not even exist. In general all our elites 
can be hardly called elites in the classic understanding. 
Intellect and intelligentsia are diff erent things to us.
Bakyt Beshimov: I do not share the opinion that 
democracy is strange to Kyrgyz people. Kyrgyz and 
Kazakh people are classic examples of Nomads and 
they do not have to apply Western models. Askar Akaev 
was considered to be a person that would bring us 
to democracy from communism. But he might have 
led to the creation of a framework for development 
of the society. His deviation from democracy was 
intentional and everything was sacrifi ced for personal 
self-preservation, instinct took over common sense. 
I think that if a person with a democratic culture, 
that understands and recognizes it, will take over 
the country and then things will start progressing.
Several years ago a group of people who now sit in the 
“White House” sat at the same round table and said 
nice things about democracy. We do not have an elite 
associated with values – ideological or moral ones.
Muratbek Imanaliev: I suggest speaking 
about economics. What economic successes 
and failures took place in 2006? What are 
our opportunities and risks in a new year? 
Sultan Mederov:   I think that year of 2006 can be called 
another year of might-have-been hopes that brought 
nothing positive into economics. That happened 
because fi rst of all our current power had no goals either 
in 2005 or 2006. Everything is done as “the road takes 
us”. There are not clearly set objectives. What type of 
a society are we building: capitalistic, socialistic, and 
nationalistic or which? We should defi ne what we would 
like to achieve. What do we want from Kyrgyzstan?
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I would not call the resolution of issues in 2006 a 
consensus. As rude as it sounds everything reminded 
me more of a dog with its tail between its legs. Let’s 
even take the process of adopting the Constitution of 
November 9, 2006 when the President only within a 
week has changed his decision into the opposite one 
just because they say he had limited information and did 
not have a proper opinion. This is a method of “hiding 
your tail between your legs”. I personally would classify 
2006 as a year of failure. Ok, in 2005 we had revolution 
but we have lived through one more year and what did 
we achieve or resolve in 2006? We did not even plant 
the seeds of what we were declaring. We simply say 
that Kyrgyzstan should take its place in the region, but 
do nothing. In the economic slot the year was an even 
a bigger failure because we had to lay the foundations. 
For example, indicators in the agricultural industry 
grew by one percent – what is it about? That says we 
did nothing in 2006 and that is a long-drawn-out result. 
Industry was completely interred. Now we are not even 
considering it as an industrial structure because it is not 
growing, although in 2004 growth made up 14%, while 
now we do not have even 6-7%. For the whole year 
there was 2.7% increase in GDP. But most importantly 
we have done nothing for development in 2007.
The most horrifying thing is not that power has no goals 
or is working more on politics, but that it is dealing more 
with the redistribution of infl uence zones. Construction 
was brought out of the economic shade and now 
everyone has rushed to start building around Issykkul. 
There was not a single session of the Government about 
developing small and medium business and agriculture. 
For a whole year decisions were made only on salary raises 
and the HIPC. That is all of the Government’s activity. This 
explains infl ation rates. Having not laid any foundation 
in 2006, already today we can say that 2007 will bring 
nothing. And that is bad. But the Government is not even 
trying to do anything to change it. One of the results 
of one and a half years work of the Ministry of Finance 
was a strategy for the state development that Japarov 
presented in October 2005, which was approved by the 
Government only in November and only because it was 
one of the conditions for entering HIPC. This is a program 
developed under compulsion and means nothing.
Thus, we have demonstrated that our economics is a 
bazaar economy because 40% of the GPD is made up by 
services. Results of research conducted by Moscow State 
Institute of International Relations are very sad. But if 
we continue dealing with political discussions ignoring 
economics then we might not be able to save our state. 
And even if 2007 shows some growth it will not be a 
result of government eff orts but the infl uence of the 
economics of Kazakhstan or something else. Economics 
in the North is “kazakhed” on 60-70%; most of lands on 
Issykkul are bought out by Kazakhs. We should yell “SOS!”
Ulan Sarbanov: Growth of GPD in 2006 – 2.7%, 
and in 2005 - 0.6%. 8% growth was planned for 
2006 but based on the latest data, growth made up 
2.7%. And a small growth in 2005 is not a reason 
to say that 2.7% in 2006 is a signifi cant growth.
In terms of infl ations, we planned to 
stay within 5.7%, and in fact  it’s 5.1%. 
Industry growth is 10%. Statements about Kumtor 
bring up dual standards. With Kumtor it is “-10%”, and 
without Kumtor it is 4.2%. It turns out that things are 
better without Kumtor. Growth is 8% in construction, 
14% in trade, 18% in investment, 19% in hotel 
business and all of it is called legalization of money.
Regarding the budget. Salaries on average grew 
by 18%. State expenses to GPD in the end of 2005 
made up 28.2% and 28.1% is expected. What does it 
mean against 2.7% of growth in economics? Budget 
is not used as a tool of economic policy. One can 
say that Government failed to recognize that the 
budget was the most important economic tool. As a 
rule, the budget raises many questions and disputes 
and if everything is calm, then it is not a budget.
Growth of money in 2006 made up 42%. It is a 
normal fi gure during stable situation and business 
development. 42% with consideration of legalization 
of black economies is not bad but not stable.’
In terms of on-going operations account of balance of 
payment. When the country was “accumulating” foreign 
debt, defi cit of the current account reached 18-20% 
relative to GPD. During a period of 2001-2004 - 1.5%, 
5%, 4.1% and 3.4%. That means we started buying more 
than earning, in other words we continue borrowing. 
Expected defi cit in 2006 might make up 11%. And even 
without HIPC we are going into the same debt issue.
Growth of export in 2006 made up 16% and in the past it was 
an average of 15-25% annually; our import usually grows 
by 30% and it made up 60% last year. We usually export 
for 719 million U.S. dollars and we import in the amount 
of 1 billion 685 millions. That’s double the diff erence. 
And it would be good if we were importing machines, 
technical equipment and kilns. I am afraid that we are just 
eating it away, even considering prices for oil and gold…
The most dreadful thing is not the GDP, but budget 
and foreign relations. A budget is a living organism, 
legislature allows introducing changes to it only 
once, and in practice it happens twice. In the 
beginning of this year neither changes nor budget 
implementation nor a draft for 2007 were discussed.
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Regarding HIPC – conditions discussed by the 
Government and World Bank are acceptable and 
realistic including the issue on power energy. But I 
would recommend not joining the program because 
in the current situation any agreement can easily turn 
out that we get into it but receive nothing in exchange.
In other words 2006 is a failed year because no 
decision on capitalization of our actives was taken 
and no consensus either internal or external was 
reached. Everything was done against legalization 
and that is why neither trust nor support is there. 
Bakyt Beshimov:  Are state 
expenses increasing relative to GPD?
Ulan Sarbanov:   2001 год  - 26%, 2001 - 28,1%, 
2003 - 27%, 2004 - 27,5%, 2004 - 28,2%, 2005 - 28,1%. 
Bakyt Beshimov:  I suspect that they intentionally 
increase state expenses to satisfy their personal interests.
 
Erlan Abdyldaev: Unstable situations in the country 
impacted foreign policy, demonstrated by the example 
of foreign policy issues when the leadership could not 
make decisions. Kyrgyz leadership is moving away from 
a multivector direction in foreign policy, keeping only to 
the northern vector – Russia and deterioration of relations 
with the U.S.A. Neither power nor opposition had a clear 
position on foreign policy issues. It was announced that 
a vision of the foreign policy is developed and under 
consideration of the JK KR but during last year we have 
not seen a clear program on foreign policy or the position 
of the leadership. There were issues with the HIPC, and 
the triangle of Russia, U.S.A and China –  the American air 
base, UN reform, water-power issues with Russian and 
other neighbors. All of it will impact the economics and 
politics of 2007 but in more tense forms. Foreign factors 
for Kyrgyzstan will only increase next year. This year will 
go under the leadership of Kyrgyzstan in SCO. HIPC issue 
and issues with the American airbase will only increase: in 
other words all foreign policy issues in 2007 will infl uence 
the international political situation in the country. 
Muratbek Imanaliev: Ishenbai Abdurazakovich, 
what are you expecting from 2007? 
Ishenbai Abdurazakov: Frankly speaking, I am not 
expecting anything radically positive or negative. 
Sympathetically and empathetically I have listened 
to your speeches full of pain, vexation and regret. But 
long ago I came to the conclusion that everything 
we are facing is a mirror refl ection of our own face,  a 
demonstration of today’s political, social economic 
and moral consciousness of society. There is nothing 
unnatural in the current events. We gained independence 
without the experience and necessary understanding 
of how to build an independent state. A collapsing 
chaotic transition towards private property relationships 
reoriented people, including state leaders, to purchasing, 
appropriation and redistribution of property. The 
Government did not become the subject of special care 
which it especially needed during the formation stage, 
but rather a source of gains. The political philosophy 
defi cit that you spoke about it was put off  for later. The 
moral foundations of state construction were washed 
out. Democracy was perceived in distorted forms, 
permissiveness became a norm, while responsibility, 
rule of law and organization were perceived as remnants 
of the past. Democracy was basically undermined.
Protest moods, initiated by a thin layer of intelligentsia 
seeking improvement to the misuse and mistakes 
committed by previous management, were used by 
forces seeking absolutely diff erent goals; the transfer 
of power and redistribution of property. That justifi es 
massive disappointments with the outcome of March 
24th events. The youth wing of participants shaped 
their attitude in the words “our revolution was stolen”. 
That is the cause of the unrest we are witnessing.
The upcoming year will not be easy. The political fi eld is 
full of traps. Offi  cials are again creating a precedent that 
might lead to unpredictable events. Even the Constitution 
is full of fl aws and fraught with the possibility of an 
outburst of new disputes, as it is illegitimate in some 
sense. Procedures were violated. Besides, the previous 
Constitution, with all its fl aws, has been approved by the 
people. Today’s Constitution despite being a new edition 
with fundamentally diff erent clauses requiring the 
agreement of the people has been passed without public 
participation. If even changes and amendments were 
taken to a referendum, a new edition certainly requires 
at least formal public approval. Civil Society is completely 
out, while the Constitutional Council was not welcomed 
and absolutely ignored. And fi nally, a new edition of 
the Constitution was passed under strong pressure of 
the Parliament dissolution, although there were no 
legitimate grounds for it. If offi  cials fall for the temptation 
to call for early Parliamentary elections, then the political 
situation might destabilize, but with more dangerous 
consequences than those of November 2006.  The 
Government has a chance to avoid this scenario of events. 
Nevertheless recent procedure of adopting Constitution 
created a dangerous precedent. Such methods impede 
the creation of a legal state. The economic situation will 
hardly improve. There are no objective preconditions for 
it. Additional factors for possible risk is the HIPC issue.
Now let me address aspects outlined by previous 
speakers. No one argues that we have to fi nd such a 
development path suitable to the specifi cities of the 
current development stage of our society. But it is 
impossible to agree with the opinion that democracy 
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Muratbek Imanaliev, President of the Institute for Public Policy
CENTRAL ASIA AND THE WORLD
There are several aspects of Cen-
tral Asian historical development. 
First, Central Asia is the place where several cultural 
and civilization threads converge: Russian, Chinese, 
Persian, Arab-Muslim and early Turkic-Mongolian. 
Second, the region lies at the crossroads of all four world 
religions: Buddhism, Judaism, Islam, and Christianity, 
with the two latter dominating in terms of expansion.
Third, Central Asia is a region of three eth-
no-linguistic zones: Turkic, Persian and Slavic. 
Fourth, Central Asia is the point of confl u-
ence between settled agricultural and nomadic 
horse economies which infl uences the world-
view and behavioral stereotypes of people. 
Fifth, Central Asia is the region where commu-
nist ideas of the Bolshevik doctrine and, tradition-
alist and pagan concepts were spread, with odd 
juxtapositions with Islam and other religions. Re-
cently, liberal conceptions including democratic 
ones have been gaining prominence in the region. 
Sixth, Central Asia is a territory where so-
cial systems are strongly infl uenced by re-
gional, tribal, and clan conventions.
All those factors have historically and persist in aff ecting 
all aspects of life in Central Asian countries, including 
the system (not the form) of and formation of mecha-
nisms of state management, the judiciary and also in-
tellectual, political and business elites and social rela-
tions. It has a direct relationship on the formation and 
implementation of foreign policy of the region’s states. 
The historical-geographical, cultural-humani-
tarian legacy of Central Asian nations is most 
does not suit us. If we distort democracy and cannot 
be creative in applying its principles then it is not about 
democracy. Yes, democracy is  complicated in the fi rst 
stages and is a painful path requiring patience and 
fl exibility. All countries went through this, not unscathed. 
But one should not turn away from it and outgrow it. 
The objective is to resist those that are ready to proceed 
to authoritarianism justifying it by challenges to 
democracy. We are not an exception. To a certain extent 
we are familiar with the values of the West and the East. 
We should not copy anyone but apply all that would 
be useful for our development. Developed or rapidly 
developing states of the East have achieved amazing 
results using this very path, they have incorporated 
the science and technology of the West into their 
framework of spiritual capacity, thus creating some 
type of a ‘jet engine’ of development.  We should follow 
this path, be more educated, and show more initiative 
and pragmatism. Should we rely upon the recovery of 
long forgotten policies? Yes, in the path agreement was 
ensured by representatives of aristocracy clan. And where 
is it now? “Rich” and “aristocrat” are diff erent concepts. In 
the past, simply rich people far from honor and dignity 
of spiritual aristocratic people were called “sasykbai” 
or stinky rich man! Murders, dissemblers, any type of 
cheaters, and people breaking promises and oath drew 
contemptuous despise. Where are these values now? Who 
is the authority today? If someone is capable of restoring 
long forgotten virtues then let us wish him a lot of luck.
And, fi nally I would like to state the following: should 
we react to various doubtful conclusions regarding the 
collapse of Kyrgyzstan? Even if that is said in Moscow? 
They discuss many things but not always with knowledge 
of the matter. Informing people about things others say 
about us is useful. But being pessimistic is silly. Active 
political life is not a sign of imminent danger; there is no 
movement without struggle. Neither true democracy, 
nor freedom nor justice has been ever achieved without 
struggle. The goal is to lead this struggle in a civilized 
manner without violence; resolution of disputes 
should be guided by common sense and compromise 
for the sake of a worthy future of our country.
                                                                       
Muratbek Imanaliev: In this sense, Turkmenbashi 
turned out to be the most honest one: he stated 
what he would do and how he would do it.
Failed state, that is what they write in closed reports in 
Moscow but that does not mean that the state can collapse, 
no. It can exist 10, 20 and 30 years. We know plenty of such 
examples. But I am surprised that people were enraged 
not with the defi nition itself but with who wrote it. 
It is unlikely that we will see something diff erent in the 
activities of our Government, Parliament and President. 
Again everything will come down to the struggle for 
power. But I hope that we will be able to create what we 
want. Although it will be challenging because most of the 
able-bodied part of the population is now living abroad. 
They are not going to come back to their homeland. And 
they are the generators of the most progressive ideas. For 
the Kyrgyz population 500 thousand people is a lot. But 
the government is continuing to sell its citizens unskillful 
and short-sighed politics that seek simple solutions.
It was very interesting. Thank you everyone.
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likely not an object of interest for other states, 
but rather a factual and semantic instrument 
in pursuit of its own goals and objectives. 
At the current time, Central Asia is attractive for exter-
nal players in two capacities: as a military and strategic 
location and as a source for huge hydrocarbon and wa-
ter-power resources. One could recall the famous thesis 
of S. Halford MacKinder: “Who rules Central Asia com-
mands Asia, and who rules Asia commands the world.”
Further, the transitional condition of Central Asia 
as, in my opinion, a concrete defi nition - post-com-
munism which possesses the following features: 
• 1)    Excessive personifi cation in choosing a develop-
ment pathway and the establishment of personal au-
thoritarian regimes; 
• 2)    Economic development modeling, which is a set 
of schemes and instruments representing its socialist 
past, a fragmentally “pre-historic” natural economy 
and a new market economy. Domination of one or an-
other in this set depends on a ruling group. 
• 3)    Strong infl uence of traditional social relations on 
the fi rst two factors which are, strangely enough, in 
the process of degradation; 
• 4)    Unpredictable and often irresponsible foreign 
policy. 
            
There are also other parameters and characteristics. 
The history of Central Asia’s modern in-
ternational structural formation can be 
conditionally divided into four stages: 
 
First stage:  (1991-1994) is characterized by an inert 
tendency of the region’s countries to maintain close 
economic relations of all types with Russia despite 
the USSR’s collapse and new possibilities. However, 
Russia, which adhered to the concept of “Russia is a 
part of the West” in that period, quite openly pushed 
Central Asian countries away. The eff orts of the West 
found support mainly in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
Second stage: (1994-1999) Central Asian countries, 
under political, moral and partly fi nancial support 
from the West, attempted to construct regional struc-
tures, including a Central Asian Economic Union 
(CAEU), the Aral Fund, and a Central Asian Peacekeep-
ing battalion. There were also attempts to establish 
a military-political union of Central Asian countries.
 
Third stage: (1999-2001) is the stage of full disap-
pointment for Central Asian countries by common 
CIS, regional structures and the tendency to build 
relations on a bilateral basis, including its neigh-
bors. The CAEU and Aral Fund gradually collapsed, 
and the idea of regional integration ceased to be 
a priority in Central Asian countries’ foreign policy. 
 
Fourth stage:  (2001-2005) started after September 11 
events and the main feature of this stage is the demoli-
tion of Central Asian geopolitical boundaries (post so-
viet) instead moving toward the widening and forma-
tion of two-vectored foreign and diplomatic practices 
in Central Asia. The direct presence of the West, mostly 
the U.S., in the region is the main actor on the stage. 
Fifth stage: (2005 - to present) dominated by mer-
cantilism in foreign policy, inter-related with the 
tendency of Central Asian leaders to prolong their 
rule and the beginning of “oil and gas” diplomacy. 
During all stages of international network develop-
ment in Central Asia, at various time sequences, dif-
ferent countries tried to build certain schemes and 
models of interaction with the region in general and 
individual countries in particular. This happened along 
with attempts to form infl uence zones on internal po-
litical life of Central Asian countries, considering above 
listed factors and features. There are some examples. 
Turkey. The most attractive aspects of Turkey’s foreign 
policy in Central Asian direction were: 1) Turkey as a 
model of development; 2) ethno linguistic solidar-
ity; and 3) common religion. Turkey tried to arrange 
“Turkic speaking train with Turkish steam” at the fi rst 
stage, actively promoting all three listed aspects. Tur-
key tried to back its eff orts by fi nancial and invest-
ment projects, and some of them were just not suc-
cessful, some of them were even scandalous. Turkey’s 
goal was to form a lasting “Turkish infl uence group” 
in Central Asian countries. In particular, through 
admitting thousands of students from the region. 
However, because of other players lack of accep-
tance of Turkey’s plans and inaccurate estimations 
made by Turkish politicians, those plans did not prop-
erly evolve, including the concerted eff ort to form 
“Turkish infl uence groups” from representatives of 
art workers, businessmen and others.. Central Asian 
countries negatively perceived the aspiration of Tur-
key to play the role of new “big brother”. The fact 
that Turkish projects were fi nancially insuffi  cient also 
played a key role in the lack strong development. 
Cultural aspects and the Islamic religion were at 
the foundation of Iran’s policy for Central Asia al-
though Pakistan’s policy relied less on these two 
factors. However, it was very clear that Iranian Is-
lam and Iranian business were not attractive for 
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Central Asian countries, except in Tajikistan where 
it flourished, which is why the dispersion of Ira-
nian influence was limited to separate programs. 
One should also take into account that Iranian, Paki-
stani, Indian experiences of development were out-
side of Central Asian countries’ spheres of research and 
application and did not spread in so called “interest 
groups”. Quite honestly the experience and oppor-
tunities of those countries were not demanded, and 
more than that, were seen as useless for Central Asian 
countries. Because of it, the infl uence of Iran, Paki-
stan and India on the internal political life of Central 
Asia is almost nonexistent, except in one-time events. 
Compared to Turkey these three countries were not 
considered priority actors at any stage of the devel-
opment of the international relationship network. 
 
The countries of Western Europe, especially Germany, 
Great Britain, France, Switzerland and other countries 
through the EU, OSCE and other bilateral relationships 
during the fi rst two historical development stages 
tried to actively infl uence the democratization of 
Central Asian’s internal political life. Sometimes - con-
necting fi nancial and economic aid with the democ-
ratization issue. In my opinion, the Europeans main 
objective was to infl uence leaders directly and form 
a new structure of relationships through humanitar-
ian and human rights defense activities amongst 
civil society. However, the personifi cation factor was 
one of the most diffi  cult obstacles along the way. 
During the third and fourth stages, the threat of Islamic 
extremists becoming stronger, Al-Kaeda’s energetic 
activity and other organizations involved with inter-
national terrorism forced both the Europeans and the 
Americans to focus their attention on cooperation with 
Central Asian states in the security fi elds to fi ght against 
these evil forces. Often not paying much attention and 
sometimes even eliminating the critical elements in hu-
man rights and other freedoms and hampering demo-
cratic processes. It appeared especially at the “oil and 
gas diplomacy” stage. Germany’s new European strate-
gy in Central Asia will be worked out based on access to 
the hydrocarbon resources of the region’s countries, and 
the focus will most likely be on bilateral relationships. 
Japan never had the goal of forming “infl uence groups” 
in the countries of the region, democracy strengthen-
ing or other goals and tried to reinforce its positions 
through fi nancial and technical aspects by providing 
expertise and other aid, as well as spreading Japanese 
language and culture in several countries of the region. 
A new “Japan-Central Asia” project correlates with the 
American “Bigger Central Asia” idea, and could work 
together with this idea for certain reasons. However, 
it is only at the stage of diplomatic negotiations now.
Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that Central 
Asia is being off ered such projects as “Bigger Central 
Asia”, the new European strategy on Central Asia, “Ja-
pan-Central Asia”, and current EvrAzEC, CSTO (CIS proj-
ects) and fi nally, the SCO as a Chinese project. Plus, let 
us not forget about Islamic options, including caliphate. 
Next, let’s examine the main group of 
players - China, the USA and Russia.
China’s leadership in the civilization of Central Asia for 
two thousand years before the British and Russians ar-
rived was never questioned, and in fact, was considered 
natural and even as sent from heaven by some. For the 
last 15 years, China has had to prove its potential lead-
ership in competition with other powers. According to 
traditional concepts, China usually works with political 
systems, but not separate individuals. However, the 
same hyper personifi cation of Central Asian countries’ 
foreign priorities forces Beijing to take it into consid-
eration and work with individual leaders. It seems that 
China is not trying to infl uence domestic situations in 
Central Asian countries, but rather prefers that coun-
tries be loyal to China on the most sensitive and com-
plicated issues, including Taiwan, Tibet, Uigur sepa-
ratists, and confi rmation of border documents. Also, 
China is vitally interested in Central Asian countries 
not turning their territories into a threat against China. 
Along with these issues, the economic, and pos-
sibly the cultural presence in Central Asia are im-
portant aspects for China in order to solve the po-
litical problems of cooperation with Central Asia 
as a part of a larger scale counter action against 
the military presence of the U.S in the region. 
China has several serious obstacles in its way. These 
self-reinforcing positions in Central Asia such as 
problems of ethno-psychological and ethno-cul-
tural compliance and the unresponsiveness of an 
anti-Chinese mood, which was formulated dur-
ing the Soviet period, as well as ethnic antagonism. 
The U.S actively uses direct infl uence on the countries’ 
leaders, the opportunities of existing “interest groups”, 
fi nancial and economic schemes, including the world 
trade situation, to achieve its objectives. In Washing-
ton’s global strategy, there is a clear tendency for the 
U.S. to try to establish certain control over the Muslim 
region starting from Magreb to the Great Wall of China. 
In this context “Big Central Asia” is a part of the geo-
political region. If they achieve their objective, then 
it will allow them to solve issues of the fi ght against 
international terrorism and gain access to vast main 
hydrocarbon reserves. However, serious errors by the 
American administration in the last few years have giv-
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en rise to doubts that the project can be implemented. 
In comparison, Russia compared to these other two 
powers not only has justifi ed interests in the region, 
but also carries a certain historical responsibility over 
Central Asia’s fate. The cultural and humanitarian im-
pact of Russia’s position remains a serious enough 
infl uence mechanism in the Central Asian countries. 
From an economic point of view, Russia controls al-
most all transport and communication networks which 
connect Central Asia with other parts of the world. 
Russia also has a serious advantage in that there is a 
presence of “pro Russian interest groups” especially in 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Plus, there are a 
number of politicians, scientists, artists and other infl uen-
tial people in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan who cherish 
positive feelings for Russia for various historical reasons. 
It is worth noting that after the September 11th events, 
an active presence was established for the U.S. and Rus-
sian Federation in the region, which is evident not only 
by the presence of military bases, but also the foreign 
policy stances of countries in region narrowed only to 
relations with those two powers. Cooperation with other 
countries, when the antiterrorist operations in Afghani-
stan started, moved to the background or lost relevance. 
There is no clear confl ict of interest between the U.S. 
and Russia in Central Asia. They have a common objec-
tive of fi ghting against international terrorism, and also 
weakly but still identifi ed “anti-Chinese” sentiments. 
However, if a confl ict escalates, then al-
most all Central Asian leaders have to 
make a choice, which is diffi  cult for them. 
“New Great Game” - a defi nition which is often used 
by political experts recently regarding the pres-
ence of leading powers in Central Asian region.
How is the use of the term justifi ed? 
Indeed, is there any reason to think that the con-
vergence of Russian, American and Chinese in-
terests in Central Asia is the “New Great Game”? 
Indeed all three powers have objective inter-
ests in the region: the U.S as super power has in-
terests in every region of the world (in any case, 
Americans announce it themselves), and Rus-
sia and China are direct neighbors of Central Asia. 
The fi rst and main set of questions:       How are the 
interests of the main players formulated? What is be-
hind these interests? Is there only an issue not to ad-
mit or force someone out of the region thus design-
ing a zone and regime of confrontation? All Central 
Asian states should fi nd answers to these questions. 
It is also important to solve the following puzzle: How 
closely do stated principles and undeclared inter-
ests of the leading countries of the world coincide?
On the other hand, what Central Asia are we talking 
about? There are two defi nitions of the region. The fi rst 
one - as a part of historical-cultural area, which includes 
not all post Soviet countries but also Afghanistan, Iran, 
Mongolia and others. The second one - the region in the 
boundaries of the former Soviet Central Asia. The latter 
defi nition is preferable for CIS countries. States, which 
are located to the south, south-west, east and west, are 
no more than possible partners on various issues of co-
operation. It is an issue of geopolitics, but depending 
on which interpretations are transformed into reality, 
can fundamentally change the future of these countries. 
A broad interpretation of Central Asian boundar-
ies can result in an immediate connection with the 
Middle East. Following the formation of a new geo-
political network and a conglomeration of politi-
cal, economic and other problems. One cannot say if 
this directly corresponds to the interests of Western 
countries and a number of Islamic countries, but it 
seems that such a construction is preferable for them. 
A narrow (post-Soviet or Eurasian) inter-
pretation is probably supported by Russia. 
Until the current period neither post-Soviet countries 
(except Kazakhstan, which started to exclude itself from 
Central Asian countries) nor their partners and neighbors 
formulated a geopolitical self identifi cation in the region 
and seemingly it will not happen anytime soon.   The 
Central Asian region possesses a more 
complicated, possibly unique, feature. 
For example, for Baltic countries there is no alternative 
to European integration: in general it is an enormous 
advantage for the region which is why there is more or 
less a clear and logical foreign policy. This foreign policy 
is generally supported by domestic forces, except frag-
mentary protests by Russian speaking communities in 
Latvia and Estonia. Here we talk not about some resis-
tance against “Europeanization” but rather about impact 
of worldview and interests of ethno-linguistic groups. 
Central Asian region is, on the contrary, as if it is be-
ing “stretched” into diff erent sides by geopolitical 
factors: to the West, Russia and Islam. Also let us not 
forget the growing strength of the Chinese vector. 
Internal political allocations in the Central Asia coun-
tries are represented by (in fact, in diff erent conditions 
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and with diff erent forces) bearers and apologists of 
all three “factions” in emerging political and business 
elites. Then there is the exclusion of big neighbor 
China - there are almost no pro-Chinese people in the 
region. Although China actively demonstrates that it 
is peaceful, predictable and ready to render any aid. 
If talking about the strength of Russian, West-
ern and Islamic positions in the region’s countries, 
it appears that Russia and Islam receive wide so-
cial support (in most cases, the population sup-
ports both sides, and there is nothing paradoxi-
cal in that). There are also certain “interest groups”. 
Certainly each of the three powerful countries, the 
U.S., Russia and China, have already proposed or will 
propose an adaptation of its value system. (Under the 
condition that no country in Central Asia yet formulat-
ed its own system of values, not to mention a common 
regional one. But, it is obvious that when formulating 
these systems they will incorporate full fragments or 
elements of values proposed by the leading powers). 
Those values are connected with a particular world-
view, philosophy of existence, educational, cultural, 
moral, linguistic corporate systems, building of state 
and society, social, and economic concepts. There are 
two important questions in this context. The fi rst one: 
is it realistic that each of theses leading countries pro-
posed or will propose to the Central Asian countries 
to apply its own system of values, declaring their val-
ues as dominant and even the only priority of foreign 
policy and as a base for mutually benefi cial coopera-
tion? Or are some of the values only instruments to 
reach certain mercantile goals? Is it interest or principle 
that is the basis of the leading countries’ policies re-
garding the region? It is obvious that it contains both 
interest and principle. The issue remains, which one 
is the priority?. The question should be thoroughly 
answered by Central Asian countries independently. 
It needs to be considered that there are contradictions 
in the approaches of the leading countries to the issues 
of globalization and the new world order. It is objective 
and preconditioned by historical-cultural, political, so-
cio-economic and even ethnic-psychological factors. In 
particular, we can describe again the problem of uni- or 
multi-polarity of the world order. However, along with 
that, all three powers (including India, Israel, and the 
European Union) face a common enemy - international 
terrorism or so called international Islamoterrorism. 
In this context, there is a question for Central Asian 
political elites - the position of leading powers toward 
current Islam, politicized Islam, “majestic” and militant. 
Formally Islam is not an opponent or the obstacle for 
the leading powers to strengthen mutual understand-
ing and further cooperation. The enemy is Islamic re-
ligious extremism, which gives rise to radicalism. The 
issue becomes whether there is any division between 
Islam and religious radicalism? There are voices of in-
fl uential politicians in America, Europe and Russia and 
other countries and regions that think it is all the same. 
Secondly, in the context of aforementioned conceptual 
approaches to the issues of globalization, do the con-
tradictions between value systems of Islam, the West, 
Russia and China pose a potential basis for permanent 
hostility and confl ict? Those issues are not easy for Cen-
tral Asian countries; they have very complicated and 
contradictory form and substance since Central Asian 
countries, including Kyrgyzstan, are considered Islamic. 
An objective assessment of  the terrorism problem 
and Kyrgyzstan’s own experience makes Bishkek sup-
port the fi ght against international terrorism. Yet sub-
jective feelings of religious solidarity amongst part of 
the population give rise to other ideas. These com-
plex issues about Islam have direct bearing on the 
presence of Russia, the U.S., and China in Kyrgyzstan. 
In publications devoted to the issue of the two mili-
tary bases existence in Kyrgyzstan, there is a high 
degree of speculation about possible confl icts 
of interests between these two leading powers. 
Currently, one can only talk about competition or con-
currence mainly between the U.S. and the Russian Fed-
eration. Offi  cial representatives of both countries declare 
positive positions, which are directed to assuage confl ict. 
A wide variety of goals and objectives on fi ghts against 
international terrorism compose the basis for tight coop-
eration between the leading countries with the partici-
pation of Kyrgyzstan. However, it is obvious that on oth-
er foreign policy stages of these countries they think and 
act according to other schemes and examples? The issue 
for Central Asian leaders is not to allow themselves to 
turn into a fi eld for the New Great Game, where the fi ght 
against terrorism turns into a power struggle for infl uence. 
And fi nally, regarding concrete international construc-
tion that emerged for Kyrgyzstan.  First, Kyrgyzstan’s 
real foreign policy is narrowed down to the relations 
with the U.S. and Russia. Second, Kyrgyzstan, with its 
two military bases, is considered as the territory which 
poses a threat for countries located to the south and 
southwest of Kyrgyzstan. Third, there is even an ob-
servable disintegration among Central Asian countries 
which diminishes the possibility of regional integra-
tion, which might be the basis for joint development 
and the common fi ght against international threats.
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On February 9, 2007 the Institute for Public Policy (IPP) 
hosted a roundtable discussion “The SCO Summit 2007: 
Opportunities for Kyrgyzstan.” Attending the closed ex-
pert discussion, moderated by Muratbek Imanaliev, 
IPP President, were Tolondu Makeev, Kyrgyz national 
coordinator for Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO), Erlan Abdyldaev, foreign policy expert of IPP, 
Ishenbai Abdrazakov, chair of Observers board of the 
Foundation for Political Research «The Project of Fu-
ture» and Andrey Filatov, deputy of Bishkek city council. 
Muratbek Imanaliev, moderating the discus-
sion, opened the fl oor by summarizing the impor-
tance of upcoming SCO Summit for Kyrgyzstan. 
According to him, on the one hand, by organizing the 
event with great care, the country has a unique oppor-
tunity to promote its interests within the organization. 
SCO is such an institution, where decisions are made 
through consensus, and Kyrgyzstan should take advan-
tage of that. It would be important to see that Kyrgyz-
stan acts on behalf of the Central Asian region in general 
and its own interests in particular, said the moderator. 
On the other hand, surfacing on the ground recently were 
the concerns that Kyrgyzstan is not ready to host such 
a high-profi le event, not the least of in terms of sheer 
logistics and organizational issues. In addition, views 
were expressed in the city council of Bishkek, where 
the event will be held, that in preparing for the sum-
mit, Kyrgyz government is putting enormous pressure 
on the city, both in fi nancial and administrative terms. 
With this introduction, Tolondu Makeev entered the 
discussion, by noting that the Kyrgyz side is hastily get-
ting prepared for the event, which is scheduled for July 
10 this year. The organizing committee lost 3 months 
last year due to political instability in autumn 2006 and 
is now working every day to catch up with all the de-
lays. Unfortunately, construction of new infrastructure 
in Bishkek has been behind the schedule, despite the 
involvement of Chinese construction companies. It was 
agreed now that instead, existing buildings in Bish-
kek, such as the city Philharmonic and government 
residences will be renovated on time for the event. 
Another important side of the event is that the sum-
mit should result in signing of a Declaration, for which 
the Kyrgyz side is preparing with full force. Regular 
meetings with SCO apparatus from other member-
states will help clarify and prepare the draft of the Dec-
laration. Expert input on main ideas to be included 
in the Declaration is welcomed, emphasized Makeev. 
Erlan Abdyldaev pointed out two issues. One was the 
issue of security during the event. If the other member-
states get concerned about traditional tension in the 
south and the political situation in Kyrgyzstan, the at-
mosphere of the Bishkek summit might resemble the 
Dushanbe summit in 2000, when security concerns fea-
tured high during preparation, to a point that participat-
ing member states have thought of rescheduling the 
event in a diff erent setting. It would be a great loss, if a 
sudden worsening of the political environment in Kyr-
gyzstan and new rounds of standoff  between the gov-
ernment and the opposition altogether precluded the 
holding of the Summit in Bishkek, Abdyldaev added. 
Second issue, more importantly, was that Kyrgyzstan, a 
country hosting an American military airbase, could use 
the opportunity to generate discussion within SCO, so 
that the organization should engage in more contacts 
and talks with the West, namely NATO and EU, as well 
as the United States. There was a sense that SCO has re-
cently been too isolated from the global process of in-
teraction among the chief powers and was used only 
to promote successful military cooperation, along with 
few declarative statements on economic cooperation. 
Ishenbay Abdrazakov said that in hosting the SCO sum-
mit Kyrgyzstan should be extremely clear about its own 
interests. Spending huge funds (by some estimates up to 
2 billion soms) and putting in all this eff orts and energy, 
what should the returns be for Kyrgyzstan? Perhaps we 
should get more practical and use the opportunity to talk 
about how to lessen the negative impact for smaller states 
like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan of too close a collaboration 
with such giants as China and Russia, asked Abdrazakov. 
Next speaker Andrey Filatov focused on the way the prep-
arations for the summit are being undermined by fi nancial 
reform started by the Ministry of fi nances. According to 
him, as part of the experimental budget reform, aimed at 
introducing a two-tier budget system, as of January 2007, 
more than 50% of Bishkek’s revenue was being taken 
away to state budget, which is a lot more than before. At 
the same time, Bishkek doesn’t see how even part of this 
money is going towards the needs of the Summit. Accord-
ing to Filatov, as Bishkek municipal authorities realize that 
the new budgetary regulations will make the city bankrupt 
in few months, the standoff  with the republican govern-
ment will greatly distract from the important event in July. 
Another disturbing tendency is that the organizing com-
mittee is using old administrative methods and forcing all 
government employees, including schoolteachers and doc-
tors to participate in massive clean-up actions on Bishkek’s 
streets. This is causing a lot of discontent and is not the way 
Roundtable summary
THE SCO SUMMIT 2007: OPPORTUNITIES FOR KYRGYZSTAN
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Institutional Aspects of Cooperation between Kyrgyzstan and the European 
Union: Unlearned Lessons
LESSON ONE: THE EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONAL LABYRINTH 
Joomart Ormonbekov, Graduate Student, Moscow State Institute of International Relations
INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF COOPERATION BETWEEN KYRGYZSTAN 
AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: UNLEARNED LESSONS
The international authority of the European Union (EU) 
as an infl uential political, economic, and military actor [1] 
in international politics is indisputable at the moment. 
Despite unstable conditions in the current international 
system, the EU managed to create a competitive institu-
tional monster, which unites 25 (soon 27) states in Europe 
under the fi rm protection of a strong Euro and mobile Eu-
ropean army. It is not surprising that in conditions of plu-
ralistic unipolarity [2] the European pole has been grow-
ing more attractive because of high level of economic 
component in construction of common foreign policy. 
In this context it is no coincidence that Kyrgyzstan has re-
peatedly declared its orientation toward the EU, which is 
one of the main donors supporting the transitional econ-
omy and democracy in the country. However, one cannot 
say for sure that Kyrgyzstan is politically and economi-
cally is committed toward the European direction. Cer-
tainly Kyrgyzstan benefi ts from the aid it receives, which 
is provided by the EU within the framework of numerous 
programs such as TACIS and the Food Security Program. 
The status of Kyrgyzstan as a partner of the EU, the 
universal Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
(PCA) with the EU and its member states, and the ex-
tensive European presence in the region provides the 
foundation for productive and dynamic cooperation 
in all spheres. However, the achievements in this di-
rection were modest, and one of the most important 
reasons for that is institutional misunderstanding.
The complex institutional structure of the EU, resulting 
from more than half a century of integration processes, is a 
serious obstacle in gaining a full understanding of the pe-
culiarities of the system. A mix of supranational principles 
and interstate mechanisms further complicates full com-
prehension of the EU as an international partner. The un-
orthodox form of decision-making in the EU, which employs 
diff erent methods depending on the type of the problem, 
and the hierarchy of decisions also fail to bring clarity in de-
termining an appropriate strategy when dealing with EU. 
In Kyrgyzstan, the Council of Europe (an international 
organization that focuses on human rights and interna-
tional law) and the European Council (the main legisla-
tive body of the EU also known as the Council of the EU) 
are often confused. The peculiarity of the Council of the 
EU is in its multiple disciplines. It consists of 9 specialized 
councils; each of which is headed by a  national minister 
from an EU member state. The European Council defi nes 
the long-term political policy of the whole union and 
uses the interstate principle in decision-making, i.e. deci-
sions made by the Council refl ects a common will of all 
member states, which is often achieved by consensus. 
The executive body of the EU is the European Com-
mission, which follows the principle of supra-nation-
ality that guarantees implementation of policies fa-
voring common European interests over national 
interests. In relations with partners, including also 
Kyrgyzstan, fi rst and foremost the Commission repre-
sents the face and generous hand of the EU, as it con-
trols the main funds for aid and development support. 
At the present moment, the role of the European Parlia-
ment is increasing as one of elements in the “European 
institutional triangle,” which consists of the Council, the 
to get the city ready for the SCO summit noted the deputy. 
In the discussion part, all roundtable speakers made inter-
esting suggestions. Erlan Abdyldaev said that Kyrgyzstan 
should soon come up with an initiative on several states, 
that are eager to join SCO, including Sri Lanka, Belarus 
and Iran. Despite all controversy, surrounding the inter-
est shown for instance from Iran, perhaps a transitional 
status, something close to that of observer states, should 
be introduced, to keep the attention of such states. Mu-
ratbek Imanaliev suggested that Kyrgyzstan could lob-
by an SCO project that would focus on decreasing the 
gaps in development of such big states as Russia and 
China and smaller members as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 
Experts recommended following steps 
to help better organize the Summit: 
• 1)   Organize a meeting, with participation of the presi-
dent, prime minister, head of presidential administration, 
ministers of foreign aff airs, fi nances and economics, and 
the mayor of Bishkek discussing the fi nancial side of the 
event
• 2)    Prepare project materials that refl ect the interests of 
Kyrgyzstan
• 3)    Kyrgyzstan should come up on the SCO summit 
with an initiative of a program that would replace HIPC 
and the Millennium Development Goals program
• 4)    Hold a presidential conference of member-states, 
partners, observer states and SCO guests as part of the 
summit
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Institutional Aspects of Cooperation between Kyrgyzstan and the European 
Union: Unlearned Lessons
As Germany took over the EU chairmanship on Janu-
ary 01, 2007, there have been heated debates about 
German (and European) foreign policy towards Central 
Asia. In this light, the recent visit of German Foreign Af-
fairs Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier to the Central 
Asian states may well trigger some false expectations. 
The six-month long chairmanship held by EU member 
states, which now serves as a litmus test of internal and 
external policy of the EU, will sink into oblivion when 
the new European Constitution is adopted. Then there 
will be one minister serving in a supra-national capacity, 
who will coordinate all foreign policy of the EU. For the 
moment, the rotational chairmanship in the EU gives 
member states an opportunity to draw shades of national 
interests into the common European policy. For example, 
Luxemburg prioritized an issue of fi nalizing a new edi-
tion of the Lisbon process, the main economic indicator 
for the EU. Austria and Finland turned its attention to the 
somewhat forgotten Balkans. In this regard, the optimistic 
mood in Central Asian countries about future cooperation 
with an EU headed by Germany is quite understandable. 
However, taking into consideration that half a year is not 
always suffi  cient enough term to realize set priorities, it 
is logical to guess that it is unlikely that Portugal, which 
will hold the chair in the second half of 2007, will continue 
Germany’s focus on Central Asia. Likely they will prefer to 
focus instead on relations with the countries of the Medi-
terranean and Maghreb. In this context it is quite obvious 
that our expectations are disproportionately high because 
of the ‘ever-changing’ policy of the EU chairmanship, bal-
anced by the steady policy of the European institutions. 
An example of such balance is the division of the mandate 
to conduct common foreign policy of the European Union 
between the so-called “unoffi  cial three”: the EU Chairman; 
the Higher Representative of the EU on Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP); and the EU Commissar on Ex-
ternal Aff airs, who belongs to various institutions of the EU. 
The EU Chairman, at the same time the minister of for-
eign aff airs of the chair state, fi rst of all pursues na-
tional interests and tries to use the European mission 
in order to promote his own initiatives at the interna-
tional level. Overly ambitious initiatives are often neu-
tralized by the conservative approach of European 
structures (as in the case with Belgium in 2001) [4].
The EU High Representative for the CFSP is a part of the 
institutional structure of the European Council, the main 
coordinating and legislative body of the EU. The posi-
tion was specially introduced to create balance and se-
cure coordination in conducting foreign policy in the 
European Council, where chairmanship is transferred 
every half a year from one member state to another 
and correspondingly priorities in foreign policy vary ac-
cording to foreign policy interests of chairman state. 
The position of the High Representative secures conti-
nuity and stability of common foreign policy of the EU. 
EU Commissioner on External Aff airs is one of 25 mem-
ber of the Commission, which is main executive body 
of the EU. Because of the important role of the Com-
mission for the EU in the international arena, the role 
of the Commissar also increasingly evolves into that 
of a unifi ed representative and spokesperson for the 
EU. The Commissar primarily focuses on the com-
mon supra-national interests of the EU and builds re-
lationships with other countries on behalf of the EU.
LESSON TWO: MECHANISM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES IN DECISION- MAKING 
PROCESS 
Commission and the Parliament. Yet, the importance 
of the European Parliament has slightly decreased, be-
cause EU parliamentarians have a deliberative vote in 
all spheres except decisions on budget issues. How-
ever, a fact that the European Parliament is a parlia-
ment in true meaning of the word, which is formed by 
direct elections and not by representatives of national 
parliaments, more and more plays important role in 
the formulation of common European public opinion. 
This gains special importance in the context of the es-
tablishment of common European political parties. 
Thus, it is clear that in order to build an eff ective partner-
ship with the EU, it is necessary to conduct full coopera-
tion in three directions: with the interstate Council, where 
the national interests of leading countries such as France, 
Germany, the United Kingdom or the Netherlands can 
infl uence the general direction; with the supra-national 
Commission, which embodies the common European 
approach and controls considerable fi nancial funds; and 
the Parliament, which has signifi cant infl uence on the for-
mulation of public opinion (the recent decision on eco-
nomic sanctions against Uzbekistan exemplifi es this) [3]. 
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Institutional Aspects of Cooperation between Kyrgyzstan and the European 
Union: Unlearned Lessons
The institutional challenges of the EU and its chang-
ing geometry must not mislead us, but on the contrary 
give us opportunity to use the situation for the national 
interests of our country. Unfortunately, today we do not 
talk about a higher level of PCA realization. Rather, the 
following question arises: “Do we want to build coop-
eration with the EU at all?” If yes, then we have to defi ne 
what we want from such cooperation. The best solution 
would be to develop an strategy, which would include a 
vision of Kyrgyzstan’s future cooperation with the EU sup-
ported by concrete plans and objectives. The very elabo-
ration of such a document will force us to reevaluate the 
European direction of our policy in a pragmatic manner.
Cooperation with European institutions is not limited to 
one or two areas, and it is important to coordinate Kyr-
gyz policy toward the EU and the material aid received. 
A wide-ranging coordinated policy for all state structures 
involved in European issues with special working group 
on cooperation with the EU guiding interactions might 
bring positive results for Kyrgyzstan. It would be wise to 
appoint a special independent representative or coor-
dinator on European policy in response to the appoint-
ment of the EU special representative for Central Asia. 
In this regard, it is important to train offi  cials with special-
ized knowledge. It forces us to think that in Kyrgyzstan, 
while there are about 40 universities, there is not a single 
educational program on European research. Knowl-
edge in this area is in high demand around the world. 
We continue to say that the European model of integration 
(especially the institutional aspect) is a model for the same 
processes in the Central Asia. But while we are engaged in 
the framework of the so-called “Bishkek’s process,” the EU 
tries to arrange negotiations with every Central Asian state 
in order to fi nd common ground, we say that we are all 
unique and need diff erent approaches. And when the EU 
tries to use a diff erentiated approached, we begin point at 
each other, demanding similar approach as our neighbors 
receive. It is a circular argument, but integration, which re-
sults from compromises and consensus for the benefi t of 
all, can lead us out of this closed circle. We must learn not 
only to receive material aid, but also to listen to advice. 
The potential for a Kyrgyz (and Central Asian) partner-
ship with the EU is huge, but a narrow Kyrgyz view of 
the EU being not an equal partner, but rather as a gen-
erous donor shifts accent and balance. Only though a 
reevaluation of such an approach, along with a deep-
er understanding of European institutions and clear 
goals dictated only by the national interests of the 
country can we fi nally open a window to Europe and 
build an eff ective, mutually benefi cial relationship. 
HOMEWORK
[1] The Western European Union, established in 1946 as an independent military union, was incorporated into the system of the 
EU in 2001 as a military component. Now, the EU possesses rapid reaction forces that consist of national military units and perform 
joint military operations (like in Kosovo). 
[2] The term of “Pluralistic unipolarity” was coined by the Russian international relations researcher A.D. Bogaturov in 1996: see A.A. 
Bogaturov, “‘Pluralistic unipolarity’ and the interests of Russia,” in Svobodnaya mysl’, #2, 1996. 
[3] Despite the generally restrained position of the EU regarding the issue, the European MPs adopted relatively strict resolution 
on situation in Uzbekistan (26/10/2006- http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2006-
0467+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN)
[4] Very ambitious foreign policy priorities of Belgium (global fight against terrorism, EU’s involvement in Afghanistan, etc.) in the 
second half of 2001 were ‘cooled down’ by realistic and traditional approaches of European institutions regarding these issues. 
[5] The PCA between the EU and the Kyrgyz Republic is valid until 2009.
LESSON THREE: AN INSIDE LOOK 
Considering the EU is one of the constant elements of its 
foreign policy, Kyrgyzstan is somewhat irresponsible about 
its partnership with Europe. The all-inclusive and universal 
character of the PCA between Kyrgyzstan and the EU [5] 
means there is almost unlimited potential for Kyrgyz-Eu-
ropean cooperation in various spheres including power 
sector reformation and border control to cooperation in 
education and culture. The PCA, which is the second high-
est normative act in the hierarchy of European legislation 
after agreements on associations, creates much space for 
cooperation, since it establishes a clear mechanism and 
institution for cooperation. Meanwhile, short-term action 
plan agreements and declarative memorandums would 
presuppose much focus on formal aspects of cooperation. 
The partnership between Kyrgyzstan and the EU has lasted 
more than 15 years. The almost legendary TACIS program, 
which terminates in 2007, has also been established for the 
same amount of time. From now on, technical aid will be pro-
vided through the line of special strategy of the European 
Commission for Central Asia..  Despite mutual attempts, they 
did not manage to move beyond simple aid packages and 
advance to the next level of developmental support. Kyrgyz-
stan did not use all the advantages of the PCA and its special 
partnership with the EU, continuing receiving grants from 
donors, including the EU, as it has during the past 15 years. 
Continuity, stability and consistency are three basic domi-
nant principles in the European system of values. The values 
unfortunately are not always present in Kyrgyz policy, which 
is characterized by mismanagement of human resources 
and political fragmentation. It is hard to talk about real part-
nership relations without fi rst having mutual understand-
ing and trust, based on work and not just on declarations.
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Round table summary
KYRGYZ FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES IN 2007
The Institute for Public Policy held a round table on 
the topic: “Kyrgyz foreign policy priorities in 2007”. 
A number of experts on foreign policy, politics 
and diplomats took part at the round table (list). 
The moderator, the President of the Institute for Public 
Policy Muratbek Imanaliev said in his welcoming speech 
that in 2007, the country’s leadership will undergo 
several important tests of foreign policy. Firstly, is 
the SCO summit organization which will be held in 
Bishkek in 2007. Secondly, this year authorities should 
normalize Kyrgyz-American relations, which have 
signifi cantly deteriorated in recent years, and direct 
relations to a more constructive course. Thirdly, Kyrgyz 
leadership should work out consistent policy toward 
Central Asian countries, taking into account current 
domestic policy developments the respective countries. 
If we proceed from the notion that foreign policy is a 
refl ection of domestic policy- an instrument which serves 
the state’s interests- then, according to Ambassador 
Ishenbai Abdurazakov, the main problem of foreign policy 
is a lack of domestic policy guidelines, with clearly defi ned 
national interests. “Foreign policy right now   is felt out, so 
to speak, and we see international relations through the 
eyes of other countries, not through our own,” he said. 
According to all participants, the main tendency in the 
last year’s foreign policy was that Kyrgyzstan put aside 
a multi vector policy. Experts stated that nowadays it is 
wrong to think that while worsening relations with one 
country Kyrgyzstan might improve relations with another. 
One of the main priorities of foreign policy should be 
an improvement of relations with the USA, or at least, 
preventing them from deteriorating. As participants 
said, it is very important that the leadership clearly 
realizes and evaluates what the contemporary West is 
exactly. According to the estimation of various fi nancial 
and political think-tanks, the USA will remain a global 
force for a long time, and Kyrgyzstan should adequately 
evaluate it and conduct policy which corresponds to 
its own long-term interests. Moreover, improvement 
of relations with the USA will result in qualitative 
growth in relations with Russia, participants said.
They stressed that the issue of relations with international 
fi nancial institutions will be also principal in 2007. Refusal 
to enter the HIPC program was strongly motivated by 
domestic policy interests, but after refusal some higher 
offi  cials stated that the country should reconsider and 
narrow down the relations with international fi nancial 
institutions. According to the participants, the Foreign 
Ministry will have to respond to reaction to these 
statements as fi nancial institutions are represented by 
donor countries, while the state budget has a huge defi cit 
without any visible alternative sources for economic growth.
Another priority direction in activity of Foreign Aff aires 
Ministry should be development of a consistent position 
and policy toward neighboring countries, taking into 
account internal political developments in these countries. 
Political modernization in Kazakhstan, the ambiguous 
situation regarding Uzbek President Islam Karimov’s 
term expiry, the upcoming congress of the Communist 
Party in China – all these factors should be thoroughly 
analyzed from the opint of view of Kyrgyzstan’s interests.
In conclusion, the participants stressed that for 
eff ective foreign policy making, the country 
leadership needs fi rst of all to work out a clear 
state policy and determine national interests.
